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ENFORCING (BUT NOT DEFENDING)
‘UNCONSTITUTIONAL’ LAWS
Aziz Z. Huq∗

W

HEN should the executive decline to defend in court a federal
law it has determined to be unconstitutional, yet still enforce
that same statute against third parties? The question is prompted by
the Obama administration’s decision to enforce, but not defend in
federal court, Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”).
But the DOMA Section 3 decision is not the first time the executive
has bifurcated the enforcement of a statute from its defense before
the bench. The practice of enforcement-litigation gaps dates back at
least to World War II. Commentators tend to judge the practice by
focusing on the merits of each enforcement-litigation gap but remain
inattentive to its systemic effects. This Article sidesteps debate on
specific cases, such as the DOMA Section 3 decision. It instead develops a default rule as a guide for executive branch practice. To that
end, it analyzes the question whether a conscientious executive
branch lawyer should view enforcement-litigation gaps as presumptively acceptable (and hence available for use) or presumptively disfavored (such that an especially compelling argument must be made
to justify its use in each case). As a threshold matter, conventional
wisdom views enforcement-litigation gaps as a kind of “departmentalism,” and either condemns or endorses the practice on that basis.
But the Constitution does not categorically allow or prohibit independent executive branch judgment on matters of fundamental law.
Working within this zone of executive branch discretion, this Article
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analyzes enforcement-litigation gaps in terms of their effect on constitutional values such as legality, accountability, and public confidence in the Constitution. This analysis suggests that the desirability
of enforcement-litigation gaps turns on what sort of constitutional
question is at stake. The practice is presumptively justified when the
executive defends an Article II value, but rests on weaker ground
when the constitutional rights of individual third parties are in play.
The government therefore ought to be presumptively willing to use
the practice with respect to structural issues, and presumptively unwilling to use it in individual rights cases.
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INTRODUCTION
When if ever, should the executive branch decline to defend in
court a federal law it believes to be unconstitutional, but then enforce that same statute? Consider three examples:
First, Section 3 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act
(“DOMA Section 3”) bars the executive from recognizing a samesex marriage, such as those available in several U.S. states and the
District of Columbia.1 In late 2010, two lawsuits were filed in federal district courts in the Second Circuit challenging DOMA Section 3’s application to same-sex spouses.2 In response, Attorney

1
1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any
ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one
man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”).
2
See Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. 3:10-cv-1750 (D. Conn. filed Nov. 9,
2010); Windsor v. United States, No. 1:10-cv-8435 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 9, 2010). In
June 2012, Judge Jones of the Southern District of New York invalidated DOMA
Section 3. See Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). In earlier challenges to the same statute, the Justice Department defended the provision.
See Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 376−77 (D. Mass. 2010) (holding that DOMA § 3 violates the Equal Protection Clause); Massachusetts v. U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 235, 248−49 (D. Mass. 2010)
(holding that DOMA § 3 violates the Tenth Amendment and the Spending Clause).
In a carefully circumscribed ruling, the First Circuit affirmed both judgments in a rul-
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General Eric Holder concluded that DOMA Section 3 conflicted
with the equality guarantee of the Fifth Amendment.3 He directed
the Department of Justice not to defend the law in the Second Circuit suits. But, Holder explained, the administration would continue enforcing DOMA Section 3 not only against the plaintiffs in
the Second Circuit cases but against all same-sex spouses of federal
employees and any others who might have benefited from federal
recognition of their same-sex marriage.4
Second, under now-expired provisions of immigration law, either
house of Congress had power to issue a one-house resolution directing the Attorney General to deny discretionary immigration
benefits to enumerated noncitizens.5 In 1975, the Chairman of the
Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law steered to passage such a resolution commanding the
executive to deny benefits to six named aliens who previously had
been granted discretionary immigration relief. The immigration
service complied. When the noncitizens sought judicial review of
the agency action, however, the Justice Department filed a brief in
their support and, contra the agency, argued that the so-called
“legislative veto” used by the House was unconstitutional.6
Third, in 1943, Congress enacted a law naming three specific
federal employees as threats to national security. The law directed
the President to end their paid employment. Despite protesting the
measure, President Truman directed that the men no longer be
paid after the termination date set by Congress. At the same time,
he permitted them to continue working at their federal positions.
When the three men filed an action for wrongful termination seeking back pay, the Solicitor General sided with the employees. He

ing likely to secure high court review. See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and
Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012).
3
See Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney Gen., to the Hon. John A.
Boehner, Speaker of the House (Feb. 23, 2011) [hereinafter Holder Letter], available
at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html.
4
Id.
5
8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1982) (repealed 1986) (authorizing either the Senate or the
House of Representative to overrule an order suspending the removal of an alien).
6
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 930−31 (1983); Brief for Petitioner at 10−11, Chadha,
462 U.S. 919 (Nos. 80-1832, 80-2170, 80-2171).
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argued that the law was both a violation of the Separation of Powers and an unconstitutional bill of attainder.7
In each of these cases, the executive branch took a bifurcated
approach to statutes it deemed constitutionally suspect. Although
Department of Justice lawyers declined to defend the law in court,
other federal officials enforced the law against third parties.8 Call
this the “enforcement-litigation gap.” One can arise if two conditions are met: (1) the government can change the status quo by
executing a law without ex ante judicial authorization, and (2) affected parties cannot seek expeditious judicial intervention to preserve the status quo. These conditions hold in many cases. An obvious exception is the criminal law, where the executive cannot
impose a sentence without seeking judicial authorization. Outside
the criminal context, however, the executive branch can often act
unilaterally to change facts on the ground, whereas affected parties
are unable to respond quickly. The executive can therefore move
first and then decline to defend at its leisure.
While enforcement-litigation gaps are easy to define, they are
resistant to simplistic normative evaluation. To be sure, the Obama
administration’s DOMA Section 3 decision sparked vigorous debate about enforcement-litigation gaps. Attorney General Holder’s
announcement triggered both powerful endorsements9 and categorical denunciations.10 In the ensuing debate, most responses took
7
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 304−06 (1946) (describing executive response to § 304 of the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act of 1943).
8
In every case of an “enforcement-litigation gap” that I have been able to identify,
the decision that the law raised constitutional red flags and therefore would not be
defended by government lawyers appears to have been made by the Department of
Justice or the White House. This is unsurprising, since legal deliberation is coordinated and directed by the Attorney General within the executive branch. See Exec.
Order No. 12,146, 3 C.F.R. 409, 411 (1979) (providing for coordinated judicial review
of constitutional questions within the executive). See generally Trevor W. Morrison,
Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1448, 1470−88 (2010)
[hereinafter Morrison, Stare Decisis] (discussing the role of precedent within the Office of Legal Counsel).
9
See, e.g., Walter Dellinger, The DOMA Decision, The New Republic (Mar. 1,
2011), http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/84353/gay-marriage-obama-gingrich-doma
(characterizing the President’s decision as “honest, transparent, and respectful of the
rule of law”).
10
See, e.g., 157 Cong. Rec. H1642 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2011) (statement of Rep. Fleming) (“It appears to me that President Obama sees no need for the other two
branches . . . .”); Tony Mauro, DOMA Defense, Nat’l L.J., Apr. 4, 2011, at 17 (quot-
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the DOMA Section 3 decision to be sui generis. They thus conflated the question whether enforcement-litigation gaps in general
are justified with the specific merits of the Equal Protection question raised by same-sex marriage.
This is unfortunate. Enforcement-litigation gaps date back at
least to World War II; they are hardly an Obama innovation. The
fact that the practice has been used only infrequently in the past is
not especially instructive. It may well be desirable to use the practice more vigorously in the future across a wider range of issues.
The mere fact of the DOMA Section 3 decision being seen as politically advantageous may be sufficient to elicit such larger usage,
particularly if the presidential election cycle brings to office a candidate with transformative aspirations. Given the range of issues
on which enforcement-litigation gaps have been employed, and the
possibility of its larger use in the future, it is surely desirable to disentangle the general practice from the specific merits of the legal
controversy du jour. It is desirable to know, that is, whether a conscientious executive branch lawyer should begin with a positive
presumption that an enforcement-litigation gap is acceptable or a
negative presumption that it is undesirable absent some special justification.

ing Sen. Jeff Sessions statement about the decision not to defend DOMA § 3 that
“[t]his one really hit me hard”); Ron Paul Condemns Obama’s Decision to Abandon
DOMA, The Iowa Republican (Feb. 24, 2011), http://theiowarepublican.com/
home/2011/02/24/ron-paul-condemns-obama’s-decision-to-abandon-doma/ (recounting Congressman Ron Paul’s public statement in response to the administration’s decision not to defend DOMA, “Today’s announcement that the Obama Administration will abandon its obligation to enforce DOMA is truly disappointing and shows a
profound lack of respect for the Constitution and the Rule of Law”); Nina Totenberg,
Solicitor General Nominee Grilled on Marriage Act (Nat’l Pub. Radio Mar. 31, 2011),
http://www.npr.org/2011/03/31/134996395/solicitor-general-nominee-grilled-onmarriage-act (reporting that at Donald Verilli’s Senate confirmation hearing for Solicitor General, Verilli stated in response to a question from Senator Orrin Hatch that
he would defend the statute from a constitutional challenge unless instructed by his
superiors not to do so, to which the Senator replied, “That is not a good answer”); accord Paul Bedard, Newt Gingrich: Obama Could be Impeached Over Gay Marriage
Reversal, U.S. News & World Report (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.usnews.com/
news/blogs/washington-whispers/2011/02/25/newt-gingrich-obama-could-beimpeached-over-gay-marriage-reversal. For academic criticism, see, for example,
Adam Winkler, Why Obama Is Wrong on DOMA, Huffington Post (Feb. 24, 2011,
12:01 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-winkler/why-obama-is-wrong-ondom_b_827676.html, arguing that nondefense of DOMA “sets a terrible precedent.”

HUQ_BOOK

2012]

9/3/2012 8:07 PM

Enforcing ‘Unconstitutional’ Laws

1007

This Article undertakes that inquiry. It asks how that conscientious lawyer in the executive, striving to maximize constitutional
ends, should approach the possibility of distinguishing enforcement
from litigation of a constitutionally suspect law. Standing back
from the merits of any particular case, I adopt what might be
termed a rough “rule utilitarian” stance and ask about “the [constitutional] goodness and badness of the consequences of a rule that
everyone should perform the action in like circumstances.”11
Should the conscientious Justice Department lawyer, that is, view
the practice as presumptively acceptable or presumptively disfavored in light of its expected effect upon constitutional values?
I conclude that all-or-nothing judgments about enforcementlitigation gaps are misguided. Careful specification of the consequences of enforcement-litigation gaps demonstrates that the appropriate executive branch default posture toward the practice
should shift depending on the underlying category of constitutional
question the executive claims to defend. Specifically, enforcementlitigation gaps should be presumptively permissive when the executive defends an Article II value and presumptively disfavored when
any other kind of value, including an individual rights question, is
at stake.
My approach is avowedly consequentialist, albeit in terms of
downstream effects that are salient under the terms of the Constitution. It is therefore vulnerable to a threshold objection: Should
not the executive’s litigation strategies be deduced first and foremost through normative-constitutional first principles respecting
the allocation of power to resolve constitutional ambiguities that
operate in a nonconsequential manner? Viewed through that lens,
enforcement-litigation gaps might be glossed as a species of “departmentalism”: political branch efforts to effectuate independent
constitutional judgments.12
11
J.J.C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in Utilitarianism: For &
Against 3, 9 (1973).
12
See Daniel J. Meltzer, Executive Defense of Congressional Acts, 61 Duke L.J.
1183, 1187 (2012) (“The question of the executive’s proper role in enforcing and defending statutes implicates the broader debate about the proper role of the executive
branch in making constitutional determinations and the relationship of the executive’s
constitutional interpretations to those of the courts.”). In the Founding era, the executive, legislature, and judiciary created in the Constitution’s first three Articles were
called “departments.” Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Con-
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There is currently sharp division in the scholarship on departmentalism. On the one hand are scholars who worry about the
seemingly inexorable growth of executive power in light of perceived deleterious effects on the polity and on individual liberties.13
They claim that the president has no authority to second-guess the
constitutionality of duly enacted statutes and instead must stand
fully behind all duly enacted laws.14 This position conduces to the
view that enforcement-litigation gaps are always impermissible.
Unsurprisingly, this is a motif embroidered by critics of the Obama
administration’s position on DOMA Section 3.15 By contrast, other
scholars defend a strong, independent presidential authority to
make constitutional judgments without respect to other branches’
views, a position often staked out on originalist turf.16 These presi-

stitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1153, 1156 n.6 (1992).
See generally Laurence H. Tribe, 1 American Constitutional Law 266 (3d ed. 2000)
(arguing that the executive need not give full effect to a judicial decree that violates
the Constitution). Departmentalist tendencies can also be discerned in Congress. See
John C. Yoo, Lawyers in Congress, 61 Law & Contemp. Probs., Spring 1998, at 1, 5
(defending Congress’s power to make constitutional determinations).
13
The locus classicus of this argument is Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial
Presidency (2004).
14
See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Executive Privilege: A Constitutional Myth 306 (1974)
(“It is a startling notion that the President, who by the terms of Article II, § 3, ‘shall
take care that the laws be executed,’ may refuse to execute a law on the ground that it
is unconstitutional. To wring from a duty faithfully to execute the laws a power to
defy them would appear to be a feat of splendid illogic.” (citation omitted)); Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of “Unconstitutional” Laws: Revisiting the Royal
Prerogative, 21 Hastings Const. L.Q. 865, 867, 881 (1994). There is a separate debate
as to whether the President must veto laws he perceives to be unconstitutional. Compare William Baude, Signing Unconstitutional Laws, 86 Ind. L.J. 303, 304 (2011) (no
obligation to veto such laws), with Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Why the President
Must Veto Unconstitutional Bills, 16 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 81, 81 (2007) (obligation to veto).
15
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, Smith: DOJ Has a Responsibility to Defend DOMA (Feb. 23, 2011),
http://judiciary.house.gov/news/2011/feb/110223DOMA.html (publicizing House Judiciary Committee Chairman Lamar Smith’s criticism of the administration’s decision
not to defend DOMA: “It is not the role of the courts to redefine that institution and
impose it on American society. The people alone—through their elected representatives—have that role and responsibility. And the President and his Administration are
duty bound to defend those laws in court”).
16
See, e.g., Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, 96 Geo. L.J. 1613, 1616 (2008) [hereinafter Prakash, The Executive’s Duty] (identifying a duty to disregard laws the President believes are unconstitutional); accord John Harrison, The Constitutional Origins and Implications of
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dentially minded scholars might argue that the president is called
on to make judgments about how best to implement competing
constitutional values all the time, and should have unfettered discretion as to how to operationalize such judgments. So, they might
reason, enforcement-litigation gaps are always permissible. Alternatively they might conclude that once a President decides a law is
unconstitutional, he or she has a duty neither to enforce nor defend.17
In practice, neither of these absolute positions derived from constitutional first principles is plausible. Rather than hewing to absolute rules, the political branches historically have carved a middle
path, sometimes but not always acting in a strongly departmentalist

Judicial Review, 84 Va. L. Rev. 333, 370 (1998) (“[I]f ‘laws’ includes all acts of Congress, then the Take Care Clause imposes on the President an impossible obligation
when a statute is logically inconsistent with the Constitution.”); Gary Lawson &
Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81
Iowa L. Rev. 1267, 1280 (1996); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous
Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 Geo. L.J. 217, 221 (1994); see
also Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 905, 919−20
(1990) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Presidential Review]; Michael J. Gerhardt, NonJudicial Precedent, 61 Vand. L. Rev. 713, 714 (2008) (defining and exploring the concept of “non-judicial precedents as any past constitutional judgments of non-judicial
actors that courts or other public authorities imbue with normative authority”); Saikrishna Prakash & John C. Yoo, Against Interpretive Supremacy, 103 Mich. L. Rev.
1539, 1564−66 (2005) (arguing for increased executive branch role in interpreting the
Constitution). The power of presidential review described in this work does not necessarily extend to the refusal to comply with Supreme Court instructions or to follow
its precedent. Compare Prakash, The Executive’s Duty, supra, at 1621 (“[E]ven after
the issuance of a final judgment based on the conclusion that a law is unconstitutional,
the Executive Branch may continue to enforce that law against others.”), with Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 81, 83 (1993) [hereinafter Paulsen,
Merryman Power] (discussing, without disapproving, President Lincoln’s refusal to be
bound by Chief Justice Taney’s ruling in Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D.
Md. 1861)). The question of compliance with Supreme Court opinions raises issues
that are distinct and separate from the questions addressed here. Enforcementlitigation gaps do not involve conflicts between the branches. Nor do they call for a
determination of the collateral estoppel effect of judgments on the government. Cf.
Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1359, 1361 (1997) (arguing that the Court’s interpretations
have “normative force” as correct readings of the Constitution).
17
See, e.g., Neal Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend,
112 Colum. L. Rev. 507, 509 (2012) (“Given President Obama’s belief that the
DOMA is unconstitutional, he should neither enforce it nor defend it.” (footnote
omitted)).
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spirit. There are sound political-economy reasons for this. The
Constitution creates political institutions that predictably share
constitutional interpretation authority among both political
branches and with the federal courts. It also fosters incentives for
Presidents to defer to other branches’ views on constitutional
meaning. Some “weak” form of departmentalism is therefore immanent in the constitutional design.18 On the other hand, the
strongest claims for independent executive branch judgment inexorably clash with the basic incentives of political actors. These predictably conduce to interbranch delegation and deference on constitutional matters, making weak departmentalism almost
inevitable. Exemplifying the ensuing weak-form departmentalism
are a range of “constitutional constructions” that have been
evolved by the political branches over time to “resolve textual indeterminacies and . . . address constitutional subject matter” in the
absence of clear direction from the original text.19 These mechanisms range from mundane statutory gap-filling by federal agencies20 to presidential signing statements.21 Enforcement-litigation gaps
are simply another “constitutional construction.” Unlike signing
statements or Chevron deference, they have not been carefully
analyzed in terms of how they affect core constitutional values,
such as democratic accountability and the rule of law.22 Hence the
18
For surveys of weak departmentalism, see generally Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully
Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on Executive Power, 54 UCLA L.
Rev. 1559, 1601 (2007) [hereinafter Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws]; Trevor
W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 Colum. L. Rev.
1189, 1240–58 (2006); Randolph D. Moss, Executive Branch Legal Interpretation: A
Perspective from the Office of Legal Counsel, 52 Admin. L. Rev. 1303, 1306–30
(2000); Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 676, 687–702 (2005).
19
Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional Meaning 9 (1999).
20
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843−44
(1984). Because Chevron distributes the labor of statutory interpretation between the
courts and federal administrative agencies based on quasi-constitutional principles of
democratic accountability and institutional competence, it is fairly labeled a decision
with constitutional undertones. And it has surely had more influence on the balance
of interbranch powers than almost any other decision formally concerning the separation of powers.
21
Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Executive Power, 23 Const. Comment. 307 (2006).
22
Weak-form departmentalism has only recently come under the scholarly lens. See,
e.g., David Barron, Constitutionalism in the Shadow of Doctrine: The President’s
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need now for a consequentialist analysis in light of the full spectrum of constitutional values.
To that end, I develop an answer to the quasi-rule-utilitarian
question whether more routinized use of enforcement-litigation
gaps is desirable or not in terms of the harms and benefits it produces. This question requires a tallying of the negative and positive
side effects of enforcement-litigation gaps independent of the merits of the specific statute implicated in a case. In my view, there are
four such side effects, which can be classed into two sets. On the
one hand, more frequent use of enforcement-litigation gaps would
have two important costs. First, it would have deleterious expressive effects by imposing demoralization costs. Second, it would
damage the mechanisms of political and constitutional accountability upon which democratic governance relies.
If enforcement-litigation gaps had only these undesirable consequences, they surely could not be defended as a routine instrument
for conscientious executive branch practice. But, on the other
hand, more robust use of the practice also would find two positive
justifications. First, the increased use of enforcement-litigation
gaps would facilitate judicial settlement of hard constitutional
questions. Second, it would also provide a mechanism for the ex-

Non-Enforcement Power, 63 Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter/Spring 2000, at 61, 64
(arguing against limiting presidential review so as to enable “judicia[l] authority to
declare the meaning of the Constitution”); Frank B. Cross, Institutions and the Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1529, 1586−89 (2000) (criticizing
departmentalism and instead proposing a “preference for rights” approach, under
which the rule set by the branch that protects the most liberty would serve as the governing rule for all branches); Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and
Nonjudicial Interpretation: Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?, 67 Law &
Contemp. Probs., Summer 2004, at 105, 123 (arguing that the scope of presidential review authority should depend on respect for “the constitutional functions and powers
of all three branches” and the “interpretive quality” of presidential decisions); Dawn
E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, 63 Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter/Spring 2000, at 7, 13 [hereinafter Johnsen,
Presidential Non-Enforcement] (advocating multifactor balancing test to ascertain
when non-enforcement is appropriate); David A. Strauss, Presidential Interpretation
of the Constitution, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 113, 115−16 (1993) (arguing that the executive should give Supreme Court authority the same weight that the Court itself would
give it, but leaving open the possibility of rejecting the Court’s view in extraordinary
situations for a moderate form of departmentalism under which presidential power to
interpret independently the Constitution is tied to whether prior courts have ruled on
the issues that the President desires to decide).
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ecutive to disapprove of a law without engaging in the historically
disfavored practice of “dispensing” with its application.23
Such gains from the use of enforcement-litigation gaps, however,
are distributed unevenly across different kinds of constitutional
cases. In one category of cases, the gains are substantial. In another, they are meager. Given this asymmetrical distribution, it is
plausible to distinguish categorically between two classes of cases
in which enforcement-litigation gaps might be deployed based on
the magnitude of the expected benefit, net of costs, from the practice. Specifically, I conclude that the executive branch is most likely
to be justified in bifurcating enforcement from litigation decisions
when the underlying constitutional concern is structural and relates
to Article II of the Constitution. By contrast, the executive has the
least justification for distinguishing enforcement from litigation positions when the constitutional value at play is an individual constitutional entitlement. The valence of any presumption respecting
enforcement-litigation gaps should therefore turn on the species of
underlying constitutional question at stake.24
This conclusion must be hedged in two important ways. First, it
does not address the background question whether the executive
should stand behind a given federal law at all but takes current
practice as a given. Presently, there is a general presumption that
the Department of Justice will enforce and defend federal laws.
That presumption admits in practice of a handful of exceptions,
largely connected to the defense of Article II values.25 I take this
general norm as a given for the purposes of this Article. Accordingly, it is my working assumption that the executive has a general
practice of both enforcing and defending a law except in some
small class of cases in which it does neither based on criteria already developed and routinely applied by the Department of Justice.
Second, I do not focus here on the historical question whether
any particular enforcement-litigation gap is warranted. My principal brief in this Article is not to defend or to critique the Obama
23
See infra text accompanying notes 281–309 (exploring concerns with a dispensing
power).
24
What about federalism values? For reasons explained infra, they fall into the second class, where the benefits of enforcement-litigation gaps do not accrue.
25
See infra text accompanying notes 171–175.
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Administration’s approach to DOMA Section 3 except insofar as
doing so casts light on what the appropriate executive branch norm
should be. My aim instead is forward-looking and normative. I am
interested here in enforcement-litigation gaps as a general practice.
The Article’s analysis is crafted to yield generalized guidance about
whether more frequent use of the practice would be justified, and,
if so, under what conditions. This in turn allows for the elaboration
of a default presumption—call it an executive branch “best practice”26—respecting enforcement-litigation gaps. That presumption
is defeasible and does not preclude the possibility that the unique
equities of a given case might warrant a different course of action.
The argument proceeds in three Parts. Part I motivates the inquiry by clarifying the conditions in which an enforcementlitigation gap is possible. It also situates the practice in historical
context by locating the DOMA Section 3 decision among examples
that reach back to World War II. Part II briefly explains why I reject an answer from constitutional first principles that ranks enforcement-litigation gaps as a species of departmentalism and
hence finds them necessarily desirable or objectionable. Part III,
which is the heart of the Article, considers at length the positive
and negative consequences of a general practice of enforcementlitigation gaps. It both works through these costs and benefits and
also considers how they are distributed across different kinds of
constitutional cases. A brief conclusion returns to the decision by
Attorney General Holder to enforce but not defend DOMA Section 3 to show by way of example how this framework for analysis
might work on the ground.
I. THE HISTORY AND PRACTICE OF ENFORCEMENT-LITIGATION
GAPS
This Part explains the conditions under which an enforcementlitigation gap can arise. It then contextualizes the practice historically by recounting its use since World War II, and explains what

26
Morrison, Stare Decisis, supra note 8, at 1456−57. For an example of an effort to
codify such practices for one element of the Department of Justice, see Memorandum
from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to
Attorneys of the Office (Jul. 16, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/pdf/olclegal-advice-opinions.pdf [hereinafter OLC Best Practices Memo].
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happens in litigation after the executive steps aside. To clarify my
object of study, I also distinguish similar, although not identical,
executive branch practices that also involve a bifurcated approach
to the law. These steps are necessary to frame a proper analysis because current debate has, perhaps understandably, been centered
on the DOMA Section 3 decision. A wider, historically sensitive
view suggests that enforcement-litigation gaps not only have had
many other uses, but also could well be more frequently employed
in the future. Analysis of the practice that turns myopically on the
DOMA Section 3 case thus will fail to capture a full range of its
advantages and costs. It will further fail to illuminate whether the
executive should ramp up, or dramatically dial down, the rate at
which enforcement-litigation gaps are employed.
A. Defining Enforcement-Litigation Gaps
The executive has an option to divorce its decision as to whether
or not to enforce a law from its decision about what position to
take in court if, and only if, two conditions are met. First, the executive must be able to change the status quo based on a federal
law without seeking ex ante authorization from the judiciary. It is
elementary civics that Congress is constitutionally barred from putting the laws into operation itself, so the executive will often be the
first mover implementing a federal statute.27 It will be the President
(or a subordinate) who decides initially whether to grant or withhold a benefit, to hire or fire a person, or to execute a statutorily
assigned task—often without seeking judicial blessing. An obvious
exception is the criminal law. The executive cannot impose criminal penalties without seeking ex ante judicial authorization. Therefore, it is not usually possible for the executive to enforce a criminal statute without at least in theory having to defend it in court.28
Second, an enforcement-litigation gap is only possible when the
affected parties cannot seek immediate judicial intervention to preserve the status quo. To see this point, imagine a world in which

27
See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986) (invalidating federal statute on the
ground that it vested Congress with impermissible control over an official with power
to execute the laws).
28
The reason for the caveat is the dominance of plea bargaining in both the federal
and state systems.
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individuals or entities affected by an executive enforcement decision could instantly and costlessly obtain injunctive relief settling
the constitutionality of the government’s action. In this world, affected parties could in effect collapse the distinction between enforcement and litigation by forcing the executive to litigate every
enforcement decision. By contrast, we are more familiar with situations in which affected parties are unable to seek prompt judicial
determination of a constitutional question due to four distinct reasons: transaction costs of judicial intervention, collective action
problems, the unavailability of expeditious injunctive relief, and
the simple fact that litigation takes time.
Consider each of these in turn. First, the transaction costs of
seeking judicial redress will often be greater than the benefit of doing so. This will be so, for example, in many cases where the government denies an employment-related benefit such as health insurance. Second, even where a class of persons or entities is
harmed by an enforcement action, collective action problems and
an absence of effective aggregating mechanisms may clutter the
pathway to the courthouse. Although some historical examples of
the practice involve enforcement against a small number of regulated parties, the most recent example of an enforcement-litigation
gap, the DOMA Section 3 decision, concerns a large class who are
all individually affected but in different and disparate ways. It is
costly for them to coordinate, share information, and converge
upon a common goal of a judicial challenge.29 Third, even when
litigation is an option—obviously a possibility in some high-profile
cases such as those involving DOMA Section 3—timely threshold
relief may still be unavailable. Plaintiffs seeking preliminary injunctive relief must show far more than a “possibility” of unlawful
harm.30 Where enforcement involves collecting monies from individuals, federal courts have long lacked jurisdiction to step in before the fact, as opposed to reviewing their legality after the fact.31
29

See generally Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and
the Theory of Groups 34 (1965).
30
Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 5 U.S. 7, 20–21 (2008).
31
See 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2006) (providing, in relevant part, that “no suit for the
purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in
any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such
tax was assessed”); Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 736 (1974) (“The Court
has interpreted the principal purpose of this language to be the protection of the
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Finally, even when an affected party does file suit, the process of
moving litigation through the judicial hierarchy can take weeks or
months even when the matter moves quickly. In that interim, the
executive can enforce the law without having to defend it. The two
conditions for employment of an enforcement-litigation gap are, in
short, met in many domains of civil law.
B. The Historical Context of Enforcement-Litigation Gaps
Enforcement-litigation gaps are not daily occurrences. But they
are more frequent than the scanty scholarship suggests. This section catalogues the history of enforcement-litigation gaps. It begins
with the first available example of the practice, which was in the
early 1940s.32

Government’s need to assess and collect taxes as expeditiously as possible with a
minimum of preenforcement judicial interference, and to require that the legal right
to the disputed funds be determined in suit for a refund.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted); accord Oliver Field, The Recovery of Illegal and Unconstitutional Taxes, 45
Harv. L. Rev. 501, 502 (1932). This rule applies in the declaratory judgment context
too. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2006).
32
No earlier examples of enforcement-litigation gaps have been identified. In addition to the cases listed in the main text, there is a 1979 challenge to a provision of the
Civilian Marksmanship Program Act, 10 U.S.C. § 4308(a)(5) (1988), which required
the Secretary of the Army to sell surplus arms at cost, but only to members of the National Rifle Association. Gavett v. Alexander, 477 F. Supp. 1035, 1038 (D.D.C. 1979)
(describing challenge filed by gun control advocates). The Department of Justice filed
a brief challenging plaintiffs’ standing to bring suit and arguing for dismissal, but declining to defend the law because the latter did “not bear a rational relationship to
any legitimate governmental interest and is therefore unconstitutional.” Id. at 1040,
1043−44 & n.19. Judge Greene of the District Court of the District of Columbia
reached the merits of the case and struck down the law. Id. at 1049. I also do not include instances in which the government has defended a law in district court, but declined to appeal an adverse ruling. Drew S. Days III, The Solicitor General and the
American Legal Ideal, 49 SMU L. Rev. 73, 80−81 (1995) [hereinafter Days, Solicitor
General] (collecting two such cases); see also Drew S. Days III, When the President
Says “No”: A Few Thoughts on Executive Power and the Tradition of Solicitor General Independence, 3 J. App. Prac. & Process 509, 514–17 (2001) (describing refusal to
defend or enforce a 1984 child pornography possession statute before the Supreme
Court, in favor of confessing that a court of appeals had erred). Nor do I include cases
such as Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), where the Department of Justice abandoned its defense of an agency position mid-stream in litigation.
The Bob Jones University litigation is unusual because the Supreme Court disregarded the government’s change of heart and appointed an amicus curiae to argue for
the position the government had abandoned. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
456 U.S. 922 (1982) (mem.) (appointing William Coleman to argue that the Internal
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1. Fighting Communist Subversives
In the midst of World War II, Congress enacted the Urgent Deficiency Appropriations Act of 1943.33 Section 304 of the statute
singled out three federal employees by name—Robert Morss
Lovett, Goodwin Watson, and William Dodd, Jr.—and directed
that they be denied any “salary, or other compensation for personal services” after November 15, 1943.34 Section 304 was enacted
despite considerable resistance within Congress. The Senate rejected the provision four times as unconstitutional before finally
acquiescing under pressure from the House.35 Notwithstanding this
congressional action, and the failure of the President to reappoint
the three employees, the agencies kept all of them at work on their
jobs for varying periods after November 15, 1943, even though
their compensation was discontinued as of that date.36 Having so
enforced Section 304, the government declined to defend the law in
federal court when Lovett, Watson, and Dodd sued for back pay.
To the contrary, the Solicitor General filed a brief arguing that the
Court of Claims judgments against the United States should be upheld.37 The government’s brief made two arguments. First, it contended that Section 304 “represents a fundamental breach in the
principle of the separation of powers” because its exercise of a legislative removal authority intruded into the President’s necessary
“power to control the subordinate officers through whom the executive function is administered.”38 Second, it contended more succinctly that Section 304 fell afoul of Article I’s prohibition on bills
Revenue Code allowed the government to deny charitable status to a religious university that had racially discriminated).
33
57 Stat. 431, 450 (1943).
34
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 305 n.1 (1946) (citation omitted).
35
Note, Executive Discretion and the Congressional Defense of Statutes, 92 Yale
L.J. 970, 983 n.43 (1983).
36
Lovett, 328 U.S. at 305.
37
Brief for Petitioner at 2−3, Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (Nos. 809, 810, 811), reprinted in
44 Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States: Constitutional Law 41, 53−54 (Philip Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter
Lovett brief]. The Special Counsel for the Congress of the United States filed a brief
in support of § 304. See Brief for the Congress of the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 24−26, Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (Nos. 809, 810, 811), reprinted in
Landmark Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States: Constitutional Law, supra, at 297, 329−331.
38
Lovett brief, supra note 37, at 66.
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of attainder.39 The Court decided the case solely on the second argument in favor of the federal employees.
United States v. Lovett is not the only case in which a Solicitor
General wished to decline to pursue a congressional anticommunist mission in written briefs to the Supreme Court.40 In
1954, President Eisenhower’s Solicitor General Simon Sobeloff refused to defend in court the propriety of an administrative determination that a federal employee was unfit for government service
when that finding was based on the reports of confidential informants whose identities were not disclosed to the employee. When
Sobeloff refused to sign the government’s brief or argue its merits,
another government lawyer, (later Chief Justice) Warren Burger,
stepped in to handle the case.41 It was through Burger’s intervention that another enforcement-litigation gap was avoided.
2. The Legislative Veto
The second important example of an enforcement-litigation gap
arose from a legal challenge to the “legislative veto,” a statutory
device in use since the 1920s that enabled one or both houses of
Congress to disapprove of an administrative agency’s action.42
Presidents had consistently argued that these vetoes were violations of the Constitution’s separation of powers,43 but had alter-

39

Id. at 57–72.
The government has both enforced and defended other anti-communist statutory
provisions later invalidated as bills of attainder. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S.
437, 438, 440 (1965) (invalidating § 504 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act as a bill of attainder after its criminal enforcement). In other cases, the
Justice Department enforced and defended anti-communist laws. See, e.g., American
Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 384, 413−14 (1950).
41
See Lincoln Caplan, The Tenth Justice: The Solicitor General and the Rule of
Law 10−12 (1987).
42
Congress first enacted a legislative veto in 1932, and subsequently passed around
three hundred laws with such a provision between 1932 and 1975. See James
Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 Ind. L.J. 323, 324 (1977).
43
See Appropriations Limitations for Rules Vetoed by Congress, 4B Op. O.L.C. 731
(1980) (finding a legislative veto to be unconstitutional); Special Message to the Congress upon Signing the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, Pub. Papers of
Dwight D. Eisenhower 688, 688−89 (July 13, 1955) (same). Presidents have also accepted other legislative vetoes without complaint, apparently concluding that they
came packaged with sufficiently desirable authorities to assuage any constitutional
40

HUQ_BOOK

2012]

9/3/2012 8:07 PM

Enforcing ‘Unconstitutional’ Laws

1019

nated between compliance and defiance. In the mine run of cases,
Presidents raised a constitutional defense yet indicated they would
comply with legislative vetoes out of a sense of interbranch comity.44 In 1980, however, Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti “authorized” Secretary of Education Shirley Hufstedler to implement
regulations that had been disapproved by concurrent congressional
resolution.45 Justifying Hufstedler’s noncompliance, Civiletti invoked both the “impair[ment of] the Executive’s constitutional
role” and the risk of “foreclos[ing] effective judicial challenge” of
the legislative veto.46
Noncompliance with the legislative veto, however, apparently
did not induce a judicial challenge of the Hufstedler regulations.
The executive had to resort to enforcing but not defending a legislative veto provision in order to tee up a judicial challenge to the
practice. A year after the Civiletti decision, the opportunity arose.
The House had ordered the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) to deport a group of noncitizens despite the Attorney
General’s conclusion that their removal should be stayed. Unlike
the Department of Education, “the INS concluded that it had no
power to rule on the constitutionality of that [congressional] order
and accordingly proceeded to implement it.”47 Before the federal
bench, both the INS and its Justice Department lawyers declined to
defend the legislative veto in INS v. Chadha, allowing legal counsel
for Congress to speak on behalf of that mechanism.48
Chadha is not the only case in which the executive has declined
to defend a federal law out of concern about legislative overreaching onto Article II turf. The executive took a similar litigation path
respecting the so-called “reporting provisions” of the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (“Balanced
Budget Act”), which granted the Comptroller General authority to

qualms. Louis Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the President
145−46 (4th ed. 1997) (listing examples).
44
Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Anthony J. Colangelo, The Unitary
Executive in the Modern Era: 1945−2004, 90 Iowa L. Rev. 601, 685 n.561 (2005).
45
Constitutionality of Congress’s Disapproval of Agency Regulations by Resolutions Not Presented to the President, 4A Op. O.L.C. 21, 29 (1980).
46
Id.
47
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 930 (1983).
48
Id. at 931 n.6.
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mandate spending reductions once a budget had been enacted.49
When the reporting provisions were challenged in a declaratory
judgment action filed by Rep. Mike Synar, the Solicitor General
took the position that the relevant part of the statute violated the
separation of powers50 and left the law’s defense to the U.S. Senate.51 Because Rep. Synar filed his case immediately upon the Balanced Budget Act’s being signed into law, however, there was no
opportunity for the executive to comply (or not comply) with its
command.52
3. Targeting HIV-Positive Members of the Armed Services
The third example of an enforcement-litigation gap comes from
a legislative effort to exclude persons with the human immunodeficiency lentivirus (“HIV”) from the four armed services. In February 1996, both Houses of Congress passed the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996. Section 567 of that bill,
added by Rep. Robert Dornan, directed then-President Bill Clinton to discharge HIV-positive individuals serving in the nation’s
armed forces without regard to whether they were medically able
to serve.53 In his signing statement, President Clinton stated that
the Dornan Amendment “violate[d] equal protection” but he
nonetheless deemed it necessary to sign the bill because of the
“great importance” of its $265 billion appropriation for military
needs.54 Initially, the Clinton administration limited itself to explaining its constitutional position on the Equal Protection Clause

49

Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 251, 99 Stat. 1037, 1063–72 (1985).
Brief for the United States at 13−17, Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (Nos.
85-1377, 85-1378, 85-1379). At least Justice White seemed irked by this decision. See
Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 761 n.2 (White, J., dissenting).
51
See Brief of Appellant, U.S. Senate, Bowsher, 478 U.S. 714 (Nos. 85-1377, 851378, 85-1379).
52
See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 719.
53
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106,
§ 567, 110 Stat. 186, 328−29 (1996), repealed by Act of Apr. 26, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104134, tit. II, § 2707(a)(1), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321−30 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.
§ 1177 (Supp. IV 1998)); Phillip J. Cooper, By Order of the President: The Use and
Abuse of Executive Direct Action 217 (2002) (describing the relevant enactment history).
54
Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1996, 1 Pub. Papers 226, 226−27 (Feb. 10, 1996).
50
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and urging Congress to undo the law before it had to be enforced.55
But after final passage of the Dornan Amendment, the Clinton
administration announced that the executive would enforce but not
defend the statute, and that the House and Senate could “if they
wish, present to the courts their argument that the provision should
be sustained.”56 Repeal of the law before it came into force obviated the need for any such congressional representation.
4. Targeting Same-Sex Marriages
Section 3 of the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act defines “marriage” for the purpose of all federal law to exclude lawful unions
between same-sex partners that are currently recognized in several
states, the District of Columbia, and many other countries.57 The
Obama administration initially defended DOMA Section 3 in federal court.58 Its efforts were not wholly availing. In 2010, a district
court in Massachusetts held that DOMA Section 3 was constitutionally flawed.59 In 2012, that judgment was upheld on appeal to
the First Circuit Court of Appeals.60
In February 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder changed tack
when faced with a decision about how to respond to two lawsuits

55

The White House Office of Communications, Quinn and Dellinger Briefing on
HIV Provision, Feb. 9, 1996, 1996 WL 54453 at *1−6 (White House) [hereinafter
Quinn-Dellinger Briefing].
56
Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement, supra note 22, at 58 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
57
Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified in relevant part at 1 U.S.C. § 7
(2006)). At the time of this writing, same-sex licenses are granted by Connecticut,
Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Vermont, and Washington, D.C.,
while Washington and Maryland have each passed laws allowing the issuance of
same-sex marriage licenses.
58
See, e.g., Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1179,
1192 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (denying federal defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim); Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt.,
699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 376−77 (D. Mass. 2010) (invalidating DOMA § 3); Massachusetts
v. U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234, 235−36 (D. Mass. 2010)
(same).
59
See Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 376−77; U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698
F. Supp. 2d at 235−36. In 2012, a district court in California followed suit and held
DOMA § 3 unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. See Golinski v. U.S. Office
of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 995 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
60
See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2012).
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filed in district courts that fell within the purview of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit had not
spoken previously to the validity of DOMA Section 3 or more generally to the degree of equal protection scrutiny that sexual orientation classifications trigger. In the first suit, the surviving widow of
a same-sex marriage sued to recover $350,000 in federal estate
taxes she would not have had to pay had her marriage been recognized under federal law.61 The second suit presented a suite of challenges by Connecticut same-sex spouses to various disabilities and
disadvantages imposed as a consequence of DOMA Section 3.62
Three months after the complaints were filed, Attorney General
Holder announced that the Justice Department would not defend
DOMA Section 3 in either suit because the administration had
concluded that the latter provision conflicted with the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.63
Holder then explained that while the Justice Department could defend DOMA Section 3 in circuits that used a rational basis framework, it could not defend the law under the elevated standard he
had determined should apply:64
[U]nder heightened scrutiny, the United States cannot defend
Section 3 by advancing hypothetical rationales, independent of
the legislative record, as it has done in circuits where precedent
mandates application of rational basis review. Instead, the
United States can defend Section 3 only by invoking Congress’
actual justifications for the law.
61

Complaint at ¶¶ 6−8, 53−63, Windsor v. United States, No. 1:10-cv-8435 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 9, 2010), available at http://law.scu.edu/blog/samesextax/file/Windsor
%20complaint.pdf.
62
Complaint at ¶¶ 4−10, Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. 3:10-cv-1750 (D.
Conn. Nov. 9, 2010), available at http://www.scribd.com/towleroad/d/41729563Pedersen-v-OPM-Complaint.
63
Holder Letter, supra note 3.
64
Id. The Holder letter claims that the change in litigation practice was motivated
by the fact that the Second Circuit had no binding precedent respecting the standard
of review relevant to DOMA § 3, whereas the circuits in which earlier cases had been
filed had already adjudged the relevant legal standard to be rational basis review. This
is unconvincing. The fact that circuit precedent suggests a low standard of constitutional review does not prevent the government from explaining to the court that a
higher standard of review is warranted based on information in the government’s possession, or indeed from seeking to have legal precedent reconsidered on the basis of
the government’s confession of error.
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. . . [T]he legislative record underlying DOMA’s passage contains
discussion and debate that undermines any defense under
65
heightened scrutiny.

In light of this conclusion, the President “instructed the Department not to defend the statute” in the two suits filed in New York
and Connecticut federal district courts.66 The Attorney General
also explained that “Section 3 will continue to be enforced by the
Executive Branch.”67 That is, the Holder letter envisaged an enforcement-litigation gap. But DOMA Section 3 would not go undefended in court. Nine days later, House Speaker John Boehner announced that legal counsel for the House of Representatives would
step in to defend DOMA Section 3.68
The decision to continue enforcement of DOMA Section 3 had
immediate, irremediable, and ongoing consequences for individuals notionally protected by the Fifth Amendment. The General
Accounting Office has previously identified 1,138 provisions affected by DOMA Section 3.69 On the day after the Holder announcement, for example, the same-sex spouse of a federal employee would still lack access to health insurance otherwise
available to a similarly situated opposite-sex spouse.70 The lack of
ongoing health coverage could influence decisions about prophylactic and emergency care. The same-sex partner could of course
purchase insurance in the market (if such coverage is available)
while awaiting a final judgment in challenges to DOMA Section 3.
65

Id.
Id.
67
Id. But in other cases challenging applications of DOMA, the Government continued to rely on procedural grounds to rebut plaintiff’s claims. See, e.g., Def. Resp. to
Order to Show Cause of Feb. 23, 2011 at 2, Golinski v. U.S. Office of Personnel
Mgmt., No. 3:10-cv-00257-JSW (N.D. Cal. filed Feb, 28, 2011) (on file with author)
(contending that the constitutionality of DOMA was not implicated by a challenge to
the denial of benefits to the same-sex spouse of a staff attorney for the Ninth Circuit
because the remedy sought in that case “is not enforceable through mandamus”).
68
Press Release, Congressman John Boehner, Regarding the Defense of Marriage Act
(Mar. 4, 2011), available at http://johnboehner.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?
DocumentID=227399.
69
U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense of Marriage Act: Update to Prior Report (Jan. 23, 2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-353R.
70
See, e.g., Def. Resp. to Order to Show Cause of Feb. 23, 2011 at 2, Golinski, No. C
4:10-00257-JSW (on file with author) (explaining that the government intended to
continue the denial of such benefits).
66
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While mitigating the harm from lacking insurance, she would nonetheless be injured because she could not subsequently recoup the
costs of such coverage if the courts vindicated her equality interest.
Beyond these tangible and fiscal costs, the federal government also
continues to fail to acknowledge private relationships understood
by some to be core to a person’s identity and self-worth. For many,
that failure will seem more significant than any financial harms.
Continued enforcement of DOMA Section 3 also had irreparable consequences in the context of immigration regulation.71 In the
immediate wake of its change of heart, the Obama administration
stayed some pending decisions related to immigration-related filings based on same-sex marriages.72 This created uncertainty for affected noncitizens. In many cases, it imposed the costs of such delay and uncertainty upon applicants outside the United States and
their U.S. citizen spouses. Stays of immigration proceeding for individuals outside the United States, for example, may well exacerbate ongoing exposure to homophobic violence.73 By contrast, in
two deportation cases, where the government stayed proceedings
for immigrants already inside the United States, individuals benefited. Those stays delayed adjudication of immigrants’ eligibility to
remain in the United States, and hence afforded the immigrants de
facto temporary relief.74 The Obama administration also subsequently suggested it would exercise its discretion to forego deportation of same-sex spouses as part of a general policy of focusing
enforcement resources on the most dangerous immigrants.75

71

This assumes valid same-sex marriages could be a statutory basis for immigration
benefits in the absence of DOMA, although there is some (dated) precedent to the
contrary. See Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1040−41 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding
that immigration law’s reference to “spouses” did not include same-sex partners).
72
Julia Preston, Confusion Over Policy on Married Gay Immigrants, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 30, 2011, at A14.
73
For a particularly striking example, see Josh Kron, Pulling Out All the Stops to
Push an Anti-Gay Bill, N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 2011, at A12.
74
The Obama administration’s position on this question has been erratic. See Julia
Preston, Justice Department to Continue Policy Against Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y.
Times, May 9, 2011, at A15 (noting that two deportation proceedings had been
stayed, but that “deportations could continue in other immigration cases involving
married gay couples”).
75
Julia Preston, U.S. Issues New Deportation Policy’s First Reprieves, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 23, 2011, at A15. It appears the relief same-sex couples receive under this policy
is not a consequence of executive disregard of DOMA § 3.
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A dispersed and varied group of persons is thus directly burdened by continued enforcement of DOMA Section 3.76 It is
unlikely all will challenge the law’s continued enforcement. In one
domain—DOMA Section 3’s application to personal income tax
filings—equality rights campaigners have attempted to mount a
campaign nudging individuals toward noncompliance.77 This might
be understood as an effort to multiply the cases in which the government is forced to mount a litigation defense to the point where
any executive branch distinction between enforcement and litigation defense collapses. But there is no indication the effort has succeeded. Perhaps litigation-related costs for individuals to defend
against additional tax assessments outweigh any financial or expressive gains from noncompliance. It is more likely that in the
lion’s share of cases, DOMA Section 3 will be enforced but never
litigated.
In explaining the executive’s decision to enforce but not defend,
Attorney General Holder could have made three other arguments
that turned on the unique particulars of DOMA Section 3 and not
on any general view of enforcement-litigation gaps. These arguments are worth setting out, although each of them fails for distinctive reasons.
First, Holder might have argued that sudden nonenforcement of
a thousand-plus provisions affected by DOMA Section 3 would
have imposed unacceptable transition costs. But the government
has dealt successfully with similar transition problems in addressing
gender-related equal protection rules that the Court began elaborating in the 1970s. In any case, it is also hard to see why the transition costs would be less if the same result were to be imposed by
judicial fiat.

76

See, e.g., Dorothy Samuels, Charlie Morgan’s Battle, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 2011,
at A22 (describing case of a married army officer whose same-sex partner “is denied
health coverage worth well in excess of $10,000 a year [and] cannot get a base pass
that would let her . . . escort their 4½-year-old daughter to medical appointments on
base”).
77
Under the slogan “Refuse to Lie,” the campaign urged taxpayers in 2011 to report
their same-sex marriage on their federal tax forms. See IRS Tells Married Couples to
File as Single, available at http://refusetolie.org/ (last visited July 19, 2012). The campaign website cautions, however, that married gay couples who underpay taxes by filing jointly rather than separately are at risk of penalties for doing so.
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Second, Holder might have argued that since the relevant Equal
Protection law was unsettled, it was appropriate to defer to other
branches’ judgments on informational and comity-related grounds.
Uncertainty about the constitutional rule, as I explore further in
Part III, cannot always justify bifurcation of enforcement and litigation defense. It suffices here to observe that such uncertainty is
ubiquitous. Many legal rules are unsettled and yet must be enforced by a state actor. Uncertainty on the ground is also endogenous to the executive’s legal positions. That is, the Equal Protection argument Holder elaborated may not have been even credible
as a litigation position until a government lawyer (rather than, say,
an academic) had made it. It is mere bootstrapping to use that kind
of endogenously generated uncertainty to justify resort to an enforcement-litigation gap. And the principle of interbranch comity
alone cannot explain why some laws should not be enforced, but
others remain in effect but undefended. The executive must decide
when to stand behind a law, and mere uncertainty cannot be sufficient to dissuade it from doing so if the government is to continue
operating.
Finally, Holder might have observed that Article I of the Constitution prohibits the drawing of funds except “in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law.”78 Congress has reinforced this rule
through the Anti-Deficiency Act, which imposes criminal penalties
of up to two years’ imprisonment and $5,000 in fines upon federal
officials engaging in the knowing expenditure of funds absent a legislative appropriation.79 Holder might have argued that a decision
to cast DOMA Section 3 aside and extend benefits to same-sex
spouses of a federal employee in some cases would have violated
the Appropriations Clause and the Anti-Deficiency Act. In one of
the two cases that prompted the enforcement-litigation gap, for example, plaintiffs sought additional benefits payment based on their
marriage to federal employees, which could conceivably implicate
an appropriations issue.80
But even when plaintiffs seek payment of new benefits, the possibility of a conflict between nonenforcement of DOMA Section 3

78

U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
31 U.S.C. §§ 1341(a), 1350 (2006).
80
I am grateful to Mark Tushnet for pressing this point.
79
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and either the Appropriations Clause or the Anti-Deficiency Act is
vanishingly small. Since at least the New Deal, appropriations legislation typically has been drawn up in terms of agency-specific
lump-sums that range from the millions to the hundreds of millions
of dollars.81 Congress long ago abandoned any effort to manage
administrative agencies’ budgets at the level of individual employees. Agencies hence have considerable fiscal discretion absent
Congress’s use of an earmark. Recent empirical work suggests the
White House also exercises considerable post-legislative control of
fiscal flows.82 Tellingly, the Office of Management and Budget
(“OMB”) instructs agency heads that they avoid liability under the
Anti-Deficiency Act provided they do not disburse funds (a) before an appropriation is made; (b) in excess of annual appropriations for an agency; or (c) in the absence of any cash remaining in
the appropriation account.83 Within the bounds of a currently
funded annual appropriation account, by contrast, an agency exercises broad discretion. Provided aggregate appropriations do not
rise beyond stipulated agency budgets, there is typically no reason
for Congress to object to nonenforcement of DOMA Section 3 on
appropriations-related grounds.84 Any concern about compliance
with the Appropriations Clause is more theoretical than real given
current budgeting structures and the broad discretion wielded by
the OMB and line agencies.

81
See Kate Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-RudmanHollings, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 593, 611 (1988) (noting that “appropriations legislation has
generally contained less line-item detail than it did in the preceding 150 years [and]
appropriations acts fund each broadly defined federal program or activity in one lump
sum, termed a budget ‘account’”). The use of lump-sum appropriations remains the
norm in current and pending appropriations measures. See, e.g., An Act Making Appropriations for the Department of Defense and the Other Departments and Agencies of the Government for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2011, and for Other
Purposes, H.R. 1, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/BILLS-112hr1eh/pdf/BILLS-112hr1eh.pdf.
82
See Christopher R. Berry, Barry C. Burden & William G. Howell, The President
and the Distribution of Federal Spending, 104 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 783, 786 (2010).
83
Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Executive Office of the President, OMB Circular A11, § 15—Basic Budget Laws, at 3, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/omb/assets/a11_current_year/s15.pdf.
84
Section 304 of the Urgent Deficiency Appropriations Act of 1943, by contrast,
would have presented the conflict acutely. See 57 Stat. 431, 450 (1943).
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5. Summary
Even if enforcement-litigation gaps are not seen frequently, they
are not as rare as past scholarly inattention might make them seem.
Their practical effects are also varied and unpredictable. In Lovett
and some DOMA Section 3 contexts, the administration withholds
funds it would otherwise disburse. DOMA Section 3, like the legislative veto, can also lead to the denial (or grant) of a nonfinancial
immigration benefit. In yet other cases, including the Dornan
Amendment, enforcement without litigation defense can lead to
the discharge of federal employees. The possible consequences falling out of enforcement-litigation gaps are thus heterogeneous. As
a result, it is hazardous to draw general inferences based on the
downstream effects of one example, such as the DOMA Section 3
decision.
C. The Defense of Federal Laws After Enforcement-Litigation Gaps
The fact of an enforcement-litigation gap does not entail that a
federal law will go undefended. Federal statutes allow either
House of Congress to step in to defend a law.85 With some frequency, Congress does exercise its option to defend federal statutes.86 In the case of DOMA Section 3, for example, the House of
Representatives stepped forward to defend the statute, acting

85
There are two parts to this proposition. First, the “United States” is permitted to
“intervene for presentation of evidence . . . and for arguments on the question of constitutionality” if a federal law is challenged on constitutional grounds. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2403(a) (2006). Second, both the House and the Senate may, under current law,
field legal representation to that end. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 288c(a), 288e(a) (2006) (authorizing Office of Senate Legal Counsel to intervene in suits in which the constitutional
powers and responsibilities of Congress are placed in issue); R. II.8, Rules of the
House of Representatives, 112th Cong. (2011), at 3, available at http://rules.house.
gov/Media/file/PDF_112_1/legislativetext/112th%20Rules%20Pamphlet.pdf (establishing “an Office of General Counsel for the purpose of providing legal assistance
and representation to the House”). There are examples of congressional representation at all levels of the federal judicial hierarchy. See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S.
811, 818, n.2 (1997); Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 223
(1986); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 571 F.3d 1200, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); In re Search of the Rayburn House Office Bldg., 432 F. Supp.
2d 100, 104−05 (D.D.C. 2006), rev’d sub nom, United States v. Rayburn House Office
Bldg., 497 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
86
See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 288h (2006) (requiring the Senate Legal Counsel to “defend
vigorously” the constitutionality of all federal legislation).
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through its Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group and hiring private
counsel.87 This is hardly anomalous. One recent empirical study
finds that members of Congress participated as amici in an average
of seven percent of those cases litigated in the Rehnquist Court
that resulted in full opinions.88
It is not clear what would happen if neither House stepped forward to defend a federal statute because, for example, intralegislative disputes or capacity constraints precluded Congress from furnishing substitute representation. A federal court might dismiss the
case on Article III grounds.89 While this would leave plaintiffs in
the odd situation of alleging an otherwise justiciable rights violation but deprived of a day in court by a defendant’s inaction, it
would not be wholly unprecedented. In a 1980 challenge to a law
that prohibited publicly funded radio stations from editorializing,
where the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) “represented that it would seek to impose only the most minimal sanction” but otherwise “will not enforce the statute,” the district court
dismissed the case as unripe, leaving plaintiffs without a remedy at
least at that moment in time.90 Alternatively, a court seeking to
87
See Unopposed Motion of the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S.
House of Representatives to Intervene for a Limited Purpose, Windsor v. United
States, No. 1:10-cv-8435 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2010), available at http://sblog.s3.
amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/House-intervene-mtn-Windsor-4-1811.pdf; Jennifer Steinhauer, House Republicans Step in to Defend Marriage Act and
Dodge a Party Debate, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 2011, at A16. Some Senators lodged individualized objections, see Letter from Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand to Rep. John Boehner,
Speaker of the House of Representatives (Mar. 2, 2011), available at http://gillibrand.
senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/gillibrand-to-house-gop-dont-spend-taxpayermoney-defending-unconstitutional-doma-law.
88
Judithanne Scourfield McLauchlan, Congressional Participation as Amicus Curiae
Before the U.S. Supreme Court 34 (2005). One recent commentator takes the position that this reflects a suboptimal level of congressional participation in constitutional litigation. See Amanda Frost, Congress in Court, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 914, 919
(2012) (proposing that “Congress take a more active role in federal litigation, both to
provide the courts with the legislative perspective on interpretive questions and to
counter executive influence”).
89
To establish Article III jurisdiction, “the opposing party . . . must have an ongoing
interest in the dispute, so that the case features ‘the concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues.’” Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2023–24
(2011) (quoting City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983)).
90
League of Women Voters v. FCC, 489 F. Supp. 517, 519−21 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (noting that the executive declined to defend section of Corporation for Public Broadcasting Act restricting editorializing and political endorsement of public broadcast licensees).
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avoid that outcome might in effect grant a default judgment to
plaintiffs and issue an order with no collateral estoppel effect.91 Or
the absence of other counsel to defend a law may suggest that the
Justice Department is under a greater obligation to present arguments in favor of a law’s constitutionality to the federal courts,
even if, in so doing, it signals its concern that these arguments are
ultimately inadequate.92
The procedural issues presented by this scenario, while important, remain unexplored to this day.93 And it is arguable that they
are unlikely to ever arise frequently enough to merit scholarly attention. If both political branches agree that a law is not worth de-

91

Cf. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 162 (1984) (holding that nonmutual
offensive collateral estoppel “simply does not apply against the government”).
92
For an example from a case concerning the compensation of federal judges, see
Brief for the United States at 28, Miles v. Graham, 268 U.S. 501 (1925) (No. 53) (“The
Solicitor General takes no satisfaction in presenting this argument for the consideration of the court. . . . As able counsel have and will argue the invalidity of the tax, it is
fair to Congress—and, indeed, it is fair to this court—that the other view of constitutional power should be fully and fairly presented, and this I have endeavored to do.”).
93
A variant of the problem arose respecting the litigation challenging California’s
Proposition 8 on same-sex marriage. The question there is once the state had declined
to defend the state rule on appeal from a district court judgment invalidating Proposition 8, whether an official proponent of the voter-approved initiative, which had
intervener status at the district court level, has standing to appeal the district court’s
decision when the state officials decline to do so. Cf. Arizonans for Official English v.
Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997) (parties must have necessary stake not only at the inception of litigation, but throughout its course). The Ninth Circuit held that in order
to have standing, the proponents had to have either particularized interests or the
state-law authority to defend the constitutionality of the initiative. See Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 2011). On January 4, 2011, the Ninth
Circuit certified a question to the California Supreme Court, asking whether under
California law, the proponent would have either particularized interest or authority to
defend the constitutionality of the initiative under state law. See id. at 1193 (order
certifying a question to the Supreme Court of California) (asking the California Supreme Court to determine “[w]hether under Article II, Section 8 of the California
Constitution, or otherwise under California law, the official proponents of an initiative measure possess either a particularized interest in the initiative’s validity or the
authority to assert the State’s interest in the initiative’s validity, which would enable
them to defend the constitutionality of the initiative upon its adoption or appeal a
judgment invalidating the initiative, when the public officials charged with that duty
refuse to do so”). The California Supreme Court upheld the intervenors’ legal interest
in the suit. See Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1005–06 (Cal. 2011). On February 7,
2012, the Ninth Circuit confirmed that ballot proponents had standing to challenge
the law, and ruled on the merits of the challenge. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052,
1074–75, 1096 (9th Cir. 2012).

HUQ_BOOK

2012]

9/3/2012 8:07 PM

Enforcing ‘Unconstitutional’ Laws

1031

fending, there may be good reason its constitutionality is never
hashed out in court.
D. Other Bifurcated Approaches to Constitutional Interpretation in
the Executive
Enforcement-litigation gaps can be distinguished from two other
ways in which inconsistencies between deeds and legal words might
arise within the executive branch: agency nonacquiescence and interagency disputes. These are both examples of “administrative
constitutionalism”: legal practices developed within agencies and
departments to execute specific statutory mandates within constitutional constraints.94 As this Section explains, neither presents the
same legal or practical issues as enforcement-litigation gaps.
First, “agency nonacquiescence” entails “selective refusal of administrative agencies to conduct their internal proceedings consistently with adverse rulings of the courts of appeals.”95 The practice
takes three forms: a refusal to follow circuit precedent not applicable in the circuit in which the agency action will be reviewed; a refusal to follow circuit precedent that is applicable in the circuit in
which the agency action will be reviewed; and a refusal to follow
circuit precedent in circumstances where the agency has a choice of
venues that both do and do not apply the relevant precedent.96 The
second case is perhaps the most interesting since it presents the
clearest example of a tension between judicial instructions and executive practice.97 While this second case presents a clear bifurcation between law as understood by the courts and executive practice, it does not involve a split within the executive branch’s own
practice.
Second, the executive is comprised of multiple departments and
agencies. Sometimes different elements take different positions on
94

William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New
American Constitution 32−33 (2010).
95
Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 Yale L.J. 679, 681 (1989).
96
Id. at 683.
97
Id. at 749−50 (arguing that with intracircuit nonacquiescence, “[a] litigant’s ability
to obtain the benefit of the case law of the reviewing court of appeals will depend on
whether he has sufficient resources to pursue an appeal to the federal courts”). Agencies are not subject to nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 159−63 (1984).
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a constitutional question. Disputes may arise for example between
the Department of Justice, which takes positions favored by the
Attorney General and the President, and a line agency responsible
for implementing a statute.98 The result is interagency contestation
about the constitutionality of a law or proposed regulatory action.
Policy differences arise because subject-matter-specific agencies often have preferences that diverge from those of elected officials. In
cultivating expertise necessary for their roles, for instance, the
agency’s staff may develop commitments to their agency’s mission.99 In some cases, this variance in preferences has a constitutional dimension and plays out in federal court.100 One part of the
federal government will file a brief at odds with the position taken
by another.101 The result is not quite an enforcement-litigation gap,
since there is a lawyer for the agency appearing in court and defending the policy being implemented on the ground. But there is
bifurcation in the sense that at least one element of the federal
government is publicly taking the position that what another element of the government is doing, or seeks to do, violates the Constitution.
Three recent examples of intragovernmental disputes in the Supreme Court are the landmark campaign finance case Buckley v.
Valeo,102 the affirmative action case Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC,103 and the challenge to the independent counsel position in
Morrison v. Olson.104 In Buckley, the Attorney General filed two
briefs. One largely supported the Federal Election Commission’s
98
Intrabranch disputes of this kind are not rendered nonjusticiable simply because
the President has some residuum of ultimate control over both adverse parties. See
United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426, 430–31 (1949).
99
See Sean Gailmard & John W. Patty, Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, Policy
Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise, 51 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 873, 874, 886 (2007).
Agencies will also attract those with preferences aligned with the agencies’ mission.
100
See, e.g., Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 Va. L. Rev. 799, 811−18 (2010)
(describing how FCC lawyers aggressively read the “state action” doctrine to pursue
substantive policy goals).
101
This possibility is sharply presented when Congress has granted an agency authority to determine its own litigation positions. Michael Herz, United States v.
United States: When can the Federal Government Sue Itself?, 32 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 893, 947 (1991).
102
424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
103
497 U.S. 547 (1990).
104
487 U.S. 654 (1988).
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(“FEC”) defense of the 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act.105
The other challenged the enforcement and rule-making powers of
the FEC on separation of powers grounds.106 In Metro Broadcasting, while the FCC filed a brief defending the statutory preference
for minority-controlled firms in the context of a distress sale policy,
the Solicitor General lodged a brief arguing that the FCC’s action
“violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment.”107 And in Morrison v. Olson, independent counsel defended
the Ethics in Government Act,108 while the Justice Department
filed a brief in support of the law’s challenger.109 These are not the
only times internal dissent has bubbled over into manifest disagreement in court filings. In the challenge to racial segregation in
the District of Columbia’s schools, the Department of Justice took
105

Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–55
(2006)).
106
Compare Brief for the Attorney General and the Federal Election Commission
at 1 n.1, Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 (Nos. 75-436, 75-437), with Brief for the Attorney General at 116–19, Buckley, 424 U.S. 1 (Nos. 75-436, 75-437), reprinted in 84 Landmark
Briefs and Arguments of the Supreme Court of the United States 514–17 (Philip B.
Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 2001). Consider, by contrast, Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), where the Department of the Interior had told the
Tennessee Valley Authority (“TVA”) that the TVA construction project would violate the Endangered Species Act of 1973 if completed. When the TVA pressed ahead,
private citizens challenged the decision under the Endangered Species Act. Before
the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General represented the TVA, and took a position
at odds with the Department of the Interior’s construction of the Endangered Species
Act. See Brief for the Petitioner at 54, TVA, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (No. 76-1701) (including an appendix of the views of the Secretary of the Interior). Note that this is a
case of an intrabranch dispute about the meaning of a statute, not about a constitutional question.
107
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8, Metro
Broad., 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (No. 89-453); cf. Brief for FCC at 21−38, Astroline
Commc’ns Co. v. Shurberg Broad. of Hartford, Inc., 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (in a consolidated case, defending use of racial preferences in FCC’s distress sale policy).
108
Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 5 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.)
109
Compare Brief for Appellant at 13–14, Morrison, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (No. 871279), with Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at
16−29, Morrison, 487 U.S. 654 (No. 87-1279); see also Letter from William French
Smith, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Michael Davidson, Senate Legal
Counsel, U.S. Senate (Apr. 17, 1981), reprinted in Special Prosecutor Provisions of
Ethics in Government Act of 1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of
Gov’t Mgmt. of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
249−50 (1981) (questioning the constitutionality of the special prosecutor provisions
of the Ethics in Government Act).
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a different constitutional position from the District’s Corporation
Counsel. The latter defended school segregation on originalist
grounds,110 while the Justice Department took an uncompromising
posture against segregation.111
In both interagency disputes and nonacquiescence, at least one
federal actor is taking a position in litigation that is consistent with
the actions of the federal government. This distinguishes them
from enforcement-litigation gaps. Both practices may raise important questions of public law, but those questions are distinct from
the focus of this Article.
II. ENFORCEMENT-LITIGATION GAPS THROUGH A
CONSTITUTIONAL LENS
This Part addresses the threshold question whether constitutional first principles concerning the separation of powers generate
an appropriate stance toward enforcement-litigation gaps. I examine and reject two possible answers: that there is no executive
power of independent constitutional interpretation, and that the
executive has plenary authority to interpret the Constitution independent of other branches.
A. Defining Departmentalism
Enforcement-litigation gaps are a form of departmentalism: the
exercise of independent constitutional judgment by a political

110

Brief for Respondents at 6−7, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (No. 8). At
the time, the federal government had delegated certain powers to the District’s counsel, but also retained broad override authority. See District of Columbia v. John R.
Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 104−10 (1953) (describing historical evolution of D.C.
governmental powers).
111
The Solicitor General filed a consolidated brief in Brown v. Board of Education
and Bolling v. Sharpe. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Brown v. Bd.
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Nos. 8, 101, 191, 413, 448). On the District of Columbia
case, Attorney General James P. McGranery cautioned that the case arose without
discovery on the basis of threshold pleadings, making resolution of factual questions
about equal protection difficult to resolve. Id. at 14. The Attorney General nevertheless recommended that the Court apply a clear statement rule to the relevant statutes
to hold that “Congress assumed the existence of a system of segregated schools in the
District of Columbia, but did not make it mandatory . . . .” Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
The Court would then issue a declaratory judgment to that effect and the District’s
Board of Education “would then be free” to desegregate. Id. at 16.
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branch.112 Executive branch departmentalism takes many forms.
Before a bill reaches the President’s desk, lawyers at the Justice
Department’s Office of Legal Counsel scrutinize its text for constitutional problems.113 The President may veto a bill on constitutional
grounds, or he may sign it into law and promulgate a statement
identifying its constitutional infirmities.114 The President’s broad
regulatory control over federal prosecutorial decisions also includes power to abandon prosecutions midstream on constitutional
grounds.115 President Jefferson, for example, ordered district attorneys to enter nolle prosequies in Sedition Act prosecutions ongoing
at the time he entered office.116 The pardon power can also be applied on constitutional grounds even if a previous criminal trial
seemingly resolved those grounds against a defendant.117 Departmentalism’s effect varies from case to case. Sometimes, it means no
law is enacted. Other times, exercise of independent constitutional
review authority means the executive “decline[s] to enforce a
clearly unconstitutional law.”118 On yet other occasions, it is merely
hortatory.
112

See, e.g., Lawson & Moore, supra note 16, at 1270–71 (establishing “a prima facie
case for a power of independent presidential review” based on the text of Article II
that is sensitive to, but not bound by, other branches’ views on the Constitution). Departmentalism can be defined as the “responsibility [of each branch] for determining
the constitutionality of actions by other departments affecting its own operation” and
the “constitutional right—or perhaps even a duty—[of each branch] to act on its own
best interpretation of the Constitution, no matter what the other branches have said.”
Mark Tushnet, Alternative Forms of Judicial Review, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 2781, 2782
(2003).
113
See 28 C.F.R. § 0.25(a) (2011) (assigning the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”)
duties of preparing formal and informal opinions and giving legal advice to governmental agencies); see also Mark Tushnet, Essay, Non-Judicial Review, 40 Harv. J. on
Legis. 453, 468−79 (2003) (describing practice of “reasonably disinterested” OLC review based on interviews with serving Justice Department staff).
114
The Legal Significance of Presidential Signing Statements, 17 Op. O.L.C. 131, 131
(1993) (concluding that a signing statement can be aimed at “informing Congress and
the public that the Executive believes that a particular provision would be unconstitutional”).
115
See Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 521, 527
(2005).
116
Prakash, The Executive’s Duty, supra note 16, at 1665.
117
On the historical breadth of the pardon power, see Margaret Colgate Love, The
Twilight of the Pardon Power, 100 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1169, 1172−87 (2010).
118
The Legal Significance of Presidential Signing Statements, supra note 114, at 133.
For an early invocation of this authority, see Memorial of Captain Meigs, 9 Op. Att’y
Gen. 462, 469−70 (1860) (asserting nonenforcement power respecting a purportedly

HUQ_BOOK

1036

9/3/2012 8:07 PM

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 98:1001

There is robust debate about whether the executive has independent interpretive authority.119 That debate is polarized between
those who suggest that any exercise of independent constitutional
judgment by the executive raises constitutional concerns,120 and
those who argue for broad presidential power to interpret the Constitution more or less independent of other branches’ views.121 Both
positions conduce to categorical judgments about enforcementlitigation gaps.
There are two reasons for resisting categorical positions; I pursue only one here. First, such claims often rest on controversial
premises about how constitutional meaning is derived. The argument that the executive has a duty to make independent judgments
of constitutionality regardless of other branches’ views, for example, is most artfully pitched on originalist grounds that are not universally credited.122 It also makes strong assumptions about the existence of “right” answers in all constitutional cases. Although I
find neither the originalist methodology nor the epistemic priors of
such arguments wholly convincing, I bracket those issues—not
every article, after all, can generate anew a correct theory of constitutional interpretation—and focus instead on the second more
modest reason for rejecting any categorical assessments of departmentalism. That is, both an absolute bar and (in the alternative) an
absolute permission for executive judgments of constitutionality
are in sharp tension with engrained features of our Constitution.

unconstitutional statute). Noncompliance provided the context to Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), and Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602
(1935), although the opinions in neither case address the legal merits of that strategy.
119
See supra notes 13–17 and accompanying text.
120
See, e.g., May, supra note 14, at 898 (“[T]he Framers rejected the notion that a
President may refuse to honor those laws that he thinks are unconstitutional.”).
121
See, e.g., Devins & Prakash, supra note 17, at 511, 521–37; Prakash, The Executive’s Duty, supra note 16, at 1629−31.
122
See Devins & Prakash, supra note 17, at 521 (basing argument on “the text, structure, and early history of the Constitution”); see also Prakash, The Executive’s Duty,
supra note 16, at 1615–17. Another puzzling aspect of these pieces’ approach, even
given their controversial originalist approach, is their apparent unwillingness to deliberate on the possibility that officials may be uncertain as to the direction or force of a
constitutional norm in a given case. Such uncertainty, even aside from consequentialist considerations to conduce to the sharing of interpretive power, may well warrant
interbranch deference on constitutional matters even on an originalist view of constitutional meaning.
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Without discarding much of the federal government’s current political economy, neither can be sustained.123
B. The Inevitability of Weak Departmentalism
Is it possible to reject categorically any form of executive branch
departmentalism? The Ninth Circuit thought so and said so in a
1988 opinion. The court confronted an executive branch challenge
to the 1984 Competition in Contracting Act (“CICA”) on the
ground that the Act granted the congressionally controlled Comptroller General an impermissible role in execution of the laws.124
Upon the Act’s passage into law, then-Attorney General William
French Smith and then-Director of OMB David Stockman directed
federal agencies not to comply with CICA.125 In the course of assessing an award of attorney’s fees and a finding that the government had acted in bad faith in violating CICA, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that “the executive branch exceeded its constitutional
authority in suspending the operation of” the law.126 While the relevant part of the Ninth Circuit’s panel opinion was later withdrawn
on unrelated grounds,127 it remains the clearest judicial statement of
the position that the executive has no independent constitutional
authority to defy federal laws. Following and amplifying the Ninth
Circuit position, some elected officials have argued that the refusal
to defend DOMA Section 3 in federal court could be a basis for
President Obama’s impeachment.128
The claim that independent constitutional judgment by the executive is impermissible cannot be squared with many widely accepted administrative and legal practices. To begin, it is inconsis123

It is worth noting that strong departmentalist approaches would throw out much
of our current institutional architecture—a fact that hints at the revolutionary and
transformative aspirations of originalism. See, e.g., Devins & Prakash, supra note 17,
at 522 (“Because the Constitution does not anoint an oracular institution with supreme authority over the Constitution’s many Delphic phrases, the President may decide whether a law is constitutional, no less than the courts.”).
124
Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1175 (1984) (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C.
§§ 3551−56 (2006)); see Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102, 1104−05 (9th Cir.
1988), rev’d and remanded, 893 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
125
Lear Siegler, 842 F.2d at 1120.
126
Id. at 1125.
127
Lear Siegler, 893 F.2d at 207−08 (holding that Lear Siegler could not receive attorney’s fees because it was not the prevailing party).
128
See sources cited supra note 10.
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tent with four “unproblematic” traditions of executive action:
“pardons, vetoes, additions and proposals for legislation.”129 Exercise of each of these powers requires presidents to exercise independent judgment on constitutional matters. Even aside from these
traditions, it is impossible for the executive to avoid all constitutional judgments without risking absurd results. Imagine a law requiring the President to arrest and execute named opposition politicians and providing that no court would have jurisdiction to
entertain challenges to such action.130 There is no serious argument
that the President would have to follow this command. More mundanely, it is undesirable for executive branch officials to forego
constitutional judgments when implementing statutory commands.
Congress often crafts broad language anticipating that agencies will
“specify through application” the meaning of the law.131 This inevitably calls for consideration of policy objectives underlying a law. It
would be passing odd for the executive to account for policy concerns but ignore constitutional concerns.132 Equally in the criminal
law context, U.S. Attorneys make many discrete, functionally unreviewable decisions with potential constitutional ramifications,
from equal protection effects to fair trial consequences.133 It seems
perverse to say they should ignore the Constitution in such a context.

129
Easterbrook, Presidential Review, supra note 16, at 906−07. “Additions” include
presidential decisions to supplement the commands of a statute, for example by supplying additional procedural protections in the service of a right. Id. at 908.
130
The example is modeled on Easterbrook, Presidential Review, supra note 16, at
922.
131
John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000
Sup. Ct. Rev. 223, 228, 258−60 (noting that “[m]uch legislation reflects the fruits of
legislative compromise, and such compromises often lead to the articulation of broad
policies for agencies and courts to specify through application”).
132
On the other hand, judicial shading of legislative text based on constitutional
concerns has been criticized on the ground that it results in greater distortions of congressional intent than mere invalidations. Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited,
1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 71, 74 (“[I]t is by no means clear that a strained interpretation of a
federal statute that avoids a constitutional question is any less a judicial intrusion than
the judicial invalidation on constitutional grounds of a less strained interpretation of
the same statute.”).
133
For an exploration of this point respecting prosecutors, see Rachel E. Barkow,
Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative
Law, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 869, 874−87 (2009).
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There is also a domain of cases in which no other governmental
actor will consider the constitutional question. Here, it is the executive or nothing.134 Since Hayburn’s Case in 1792, it has been
clear that the language in Article III of the Constitution imposes
constraints on ex ante judicial settlement of legal questions.135
Unless a law creates discrete and actionable downstream harms,
those questions may never be answered by a court.136 The “political
question” doctrine also carves out large domains in which judicial
settlement of a constitutional question will never be available,137
even when judicially cognizable harms have occurred.138 Aside from
justiciability limits, institutional constraints on judicial fact-finding
and the difficulties of fashioning stable agreement on multimember benches139 cap the utility of judicial review. As a result,
many constitutional norms are “underenforced” in court.140 Executive officials are often better positioned than federal judges to engage in delicate inquiries into factual circumstances and legislative
motives. They are thus arguably better positioned to identify constitutionally problematic enactments.141
Finally, ordinary resource constraints counsel for judicious exercise of executive branch constitutional judgment. Adjudication is a
134
See generally Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 Harv. L. Rev.
1688, 1694−97 (2011) [hereinafter Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism] (reviewing
Bruce Ackerman, The Decline and Fall of the American Republic (2010)).
135
Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
136
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560−61 (1992) (noting that the
“irreducible constitutional minimum” of Article III standing analysis is that a favorable resolution of the plaintiff’s claim will “likely” result in a concrete injury being
“redressed”).
137
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211−17 (1962) (enumerating “formulations” of
the political question doctrine).
138
See, e.g., El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 840−49 (D.C.
Cir. 2010); Doe v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 546, 578–82 (2010).
139
Multi-member courts are vulnerable to “cycling” and other deliberative pathologies that render the results of majority decisional procedures arguably arbitrary and
unstable. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 Harv. L. Rev.
802, 816−21 (1982).
140
Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1213 (1978); see also Barron, supra note 22, at
68 (arguing that “not even the Court believes [judicial doctrine] represent[s] a comprehensive, and thus preclusive, rendering of the meaning of the Constitution”).
141
Barron, supra note 22, at 71; see also Meltzer, supra note 12, at 1191 (emphasizing broad range of circumstances in which the executive must take account of constitutional concerns).
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costly good increasingly in demand.142 Plea bargaining’s rise is only
the most notorious effort to allocate in an optimal fashion scarce
adjudicative resources.143 As the demand for adjudication rises,
pressure to head off that growth by allowing the executive to exercise independent constitutional judgment will grow. Bureaucratic
determinations of constitutional questions in the waning shadow of
Article III adjudication may increasingly be the future of constitutional law. Given such scarcity, strong reliance on the federal
courts as the source of final resolutions of constitutional meaning is
therefore a problematic strategy for across-the-board resolution of
constitutional questions.144
A contrary argument worth considering focuses upon the involvement of both Congress and the President in the lawmaking
process.145 Given that both branches have had an opportunity to influence laws’ substance in the legislative process, perhaps the executive should not have a “second bite” at the apple. Yet this is an
unsatisfying response. As an empirical matter, Congress enacts
laws that undermine constitutional values with some frequency. At
least since the Civil War, the rate of judicial invalidation of federal
statutes has ticked persistently upward.146 This suggests bicameralism and presentment do not prevent all unconstitutional enactments. Wholesale executive branch self-restraint is therefore undesirable. Nor is reliance on the veto power persuasive. Increasing
use of omnibus legislation bundling together policy choices and
“must-pass” appropriations blunts its efficacy.147

142
Cf. Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Challenge and Reform 62−63 (2d ed.
1999) (charting increasing federal court caseload over the twentieth century).
143
Compare Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 Yale L.J.
1969, 1975 (1992) (endorsing plea bargaining), with Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining
Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 464 (2004) (arguing that plea bargaining is structurally beset by distortions).
144
See infra Section II.C.
145
See U.S. Const. art. 1, § 7, cl. 2. Supermajorities in both houses can substitute for
presidential involvement.
146
See Aziz Z. Huq, When Was Judicial Self-Restraint?, 100 Calif. L. Rev. 579, 584–
86 (2012) (charting historical path of judicial activism from 1800 to 2000).
147
See Judith A. Best, Budgetary Breakdown and the Vitiation of the Veto, in The
Fettered Presidency: Legal Constraints on the Executive Branch 119, 121−23 (L.
Gordon Crovitz & Jeremy A. Rabkin eds., 1989) (arguing that the last-minute omnibus appropriations bill is virtually veto proof).
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In sum, it would be both impossible and undesirable to eliminate
all independent constitutional judgment on the executive’s part.
Administrations of both parties have long claimed authority to disregard some federal laws.148 Creating the Solicitor General’s office,
Congress effectively affirmed the broad scope of executive branch
legal discretion.149 For all intents and purposes, therefore, weakform departmentalism is an entrenched, durable fixture of American constitutional practice. Enforcement-litigation gaps cannot be
rejected on the ground that independent executive judgment on
constitutional matters is never acceptable.
C. The Impossibility of Strong-Form Departmentalism
What then of the opposite position—that the executive branch
should always implement an independent constitutional judgment
without deference to either coordinate branch?150 This strong-form
departmentalist claim is also untenable. There are two problems
with it. First, it is in tension with the “current widespread non-use”
of an independent executive power of interpretation.151 Second,
strong-form departmentalism is not “incentive compatible” with
the institutional arrangements created by the Constitution. Whatever its originalist pedigree, it is therefore unlikely to provide effective guidance on the ground.

148
Two recent clear statements were promulgated during Democratic administrations, but there is little question that the Republican administrations take the same
approach. See Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Attorney General, to the Hon.
Abner J. Mikva, Counsel to the President, Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes (Nov. 2, 1994), 18 Op. O.L.C. 199 (1994), available at
http://www.justice.gov/olc/nonexcut.htm [hereinafter Dellinger Memo]; The Attorney
General’s Duty to Defend and Enforce Constitutionally Objectionable Legislation,
4A Op. O.L.C. 55 (1980) [hereinafter Civiletti Memo]. For legal opinions from Republican Administrations, see Issues Raised by Provisions Directing Issuance of Official or Diplomatic Passports, 16 Op. O.L.C. 18, 31−36 (1992); Issues Raised by Foreign Relations Authorization Bill, 14 Op. O.L.C. 37, 46−52 (1990). These instances
must be distinguished from refusals to comply with statutory commands on nonconstitutional grounds. See Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 44−46 (1975) (declining
to find statutory authority to withhold spending via impoundment); cf. Fisher, supra
note 43, at 133−34 (summarizing historical disputes about the impoundment power).
149
28 U.S.C. § 505 (2006) (requiring that the Solicitor General be “learned in the
law”).
150
The claim is advanced by the sources cited supra note 16.
151
Paulsen, Merryman Power, supra note 16, at 105–06.
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As a threshold matter, history does not support the strong claim
of independent presidential authority to interpret the Constitution
in spite of other branches’ interpretations. While there are historical instances aplenty of Presidents exercising constitutional judgment absent contrary direction from other branches, examples of
presidential action based on independent constitutional judgments
in the teeth of other branches’ opposition are surprisingly few and
far between.152 In the early stages of the Civil War in 1861, for example, President Lincoln famously declined to obey Chief Judge
Roger Taney’s order in a habeas proceeding captioned Ex parte
Merryman.153 But Lincoln’s subsequent defense of his 1861 actions
to Congress was “labored” and “a bit muddled,” hinting at his
“sincere doubts about the policy.”154 Even in the medium term,
Lincoln’s faith waivered. He sought congressional authorization for
subsequent suspensions of the Great Writ in the form of the March
3, 1863, Habeas Corpus Act.155
Lincoln’s case, to be sure, is unusual because he did not merely
exercise independent judgment, but also defied a federal court order. But other celebrated examples of strong-form departmentalism in action fare no better. In an April 1941 memorandum signed
after the Lend-Lease Act’s passage,156 Franklin Delano Roosevelt
stated that a provision of the Act authorizing Congress to curtail
the powers delegated via a concurrent resolution was “unconstitutional, and [the presidential signature] may not be construed as a
tacit acquiescence in any contrary view.”157 Roosevelt, unlike Lin-

152

Cf. Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 Colum. L.
Rev. 1, 29 (1993) (“Outright claims of ‘executive Power’ to disregard statutes are now
seldom advanced before the senior judges.”). The exercise of independent presidential judgment respecting a constitutional question in the absence of any information
about other branches’ views is not especially probative of the strength of strong departmentalist claims.
153
17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861).
154
Mark E. Neely, Jr., The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties
11−13 (1991). More robust was the Jacksonian defense offered by Lincoln’s Attorney
General Edward Bates. See 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 74, 76 (1861).
155
Neely, supra note 154, at 68.
156
See Act of Mar. 11, 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-11, 55 Stat. 31 (1941) (authorizing President to provide allies, including the United Kingdom, China, the Soviet Union, and
France, with war-related supplies).
157
Robert H. Jackson, A Presidential Legal Opinion, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1353, 1358
(1953).
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coln, never had occasion to act upon that independent judgment.
More recently, the dispute over CICA generated another case in
which executive branch officials took a robust view of executive interpretive authority but got a frosty welcome in the courts.158
This historical lacuna is not conclusive proof against the existence of plenary presidential interpretive authority. It might be
that “current widespread non-use of [strong executive claims to interpretive autonomy] reflects not a deficiency in the argument for
its existence but merely executive forbearance (or perhaps political
reality or cowardice).”159 But traditions and routinized governmental behavior count in filling gaps in the Constitution’s meaning.160
They are a staple of constitutional interpretation by both the executive and the courts.161 The evidence suggests that Presidents do
not frequently treat their view of the Constitution as a trump in the
teeth of another branch’s contrary judgment.
Second, this historical gap can be explained by observing that
there is no “incentive-compatible” account of a presidential power
of independent constitutional interpretation. To the contrary, the
Constitution creates irresistible incentives to share interpretative
authority such that efforts to impose a duty of executive interpretive independence are likely whistling in the wind.
An important and growing body of scholarship at the intersection of political science and law demonstrates that executive actors
have “many” incentives to delegate the power of constitutional review to the federal courts, and then to defer to judicial resolutions

158

See supra text accompanying notes 124–128.
Paulsen, Merryman Power, supra note 16, at 105−06.
160
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating that “a systematic, unbroken, executive practice,
long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged
in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it were
such exercise of power part of the structure of our government, may be treated as a
gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the President”).
161
Accord Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 826−28 (1997); see, e.g., Va. Office for Prot.
& Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1641 (2011) (“Lack of historical precedent
can indicate a constitutional infirmity . . . .”); OLC Best Practices Memo, supra note
26, at 2 (“Particularly where the question relates to the authorities of the President or
other executive officers or the allocation of powers between the branches of the Government, precedent and historical practice are often of special relevance.”).
159
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of constitutional questions.162 This literature suggests, in short, that
judicial review has political foundations.163 National political coalitions resort to the courts as tools of political change because the
Constitution’s architecture engenders several distinct incentives for
them to do so. First, the Constitution makes lawmaking costly since
at each stage of the Article I, Section 7 process a different minority
can impede a law’s passage. Absent pay-offs to each potential minority veto-wielder, legislation is unlikely to be a vehicle for policy
change. The consequence of making legal change through Congress difficult and costly is to encourage politicians to seek alternative modalities of policy change.164 That is, it is the Constitution itself that induces efforts to circumvent the legislative process
through delegation or deference to the courts as vehicles for policy
change.165
A second aspect of the Constitution’s design that fosters incentives toward judicial policy making is “Our Federalism.”166 One of
the most important innovations in the Constitution was the creation of an extended Republic through partial consolidation of the
several states. This federal structure inexorably yields policy heterogeneity as people move between states seeking an attractive
package of regulations and taxation.167 A national political coalition
will inevitably disagree with at least some state policies. Accord162
Keith E. Whittington, Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy: The Presidency, the Supreme Court, and Constitutional Leadership in U.S. History 104 (2007)
[hereinafter Whittington, Political Foundations].
163
Id. at 120−21.
164
See Keith Krehbiel, Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking 34−39 (1998)
(providing analysis of the effects of bicameralism and presentation on legal stability);
Charles Stewart III, Analyzing Congress 364−65 (2001) (modeling effects of a threefifths cloture rule); see also George Tsebelis, Decision Making in Political Systems:
Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism, 25 Brit. J. Pol. Sci. 289, 293 (1995).
165
The point has been most forcefully made respecting legislative incentives. See
David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Approach to Policy-Making Under Separate Powers 197 (1999) (arguing that as complexity, difficulty, and enactment costs of legislative specification rise, legislators will
tend more and more to delegate decisions rather than resolving hard questions themselves).
166
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
167
See Jenna Bednar, The Robust Federation: Principles of Design 30−35 (2009)
(explaining link between federalism and policy innovation). The canonical judicial
citation is New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 280 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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ingly, it is predictable that national political coalitions will seek to
flex political muscles by moving against regional policy outliers.
Even as federalism induces policy change by creating circumstances in which it is almost inconceivable that a national political
coalition cannot find some state policies they wish to reject, the
separation of powers between the federal political branches stifles
political change via the national legislative process. The combination of large demand and costly and constrained supply means that
federal politicians will work furiously to find alternative ways to
obtain policy goals. The result has been the long-standing embrace
by federal politicians of judicial review to police the states.168
Amplifying that push, judicial review allows politicians to “reduce . . . political risk by seeking and obtaining the approval of another government branch” for a policy.169 With judicial ratification
of a policy, political actors signal that a given proposal is not
merely the product of idiosyncratic preferences or interest-group
capture. Courts’ endorsement thereby “shield[s] individual legislators and the coalition as a whole from having to take clear positions on politically risky issues” while at the same time achieving
desirable policy outcomes.170
In short, our constitutional system is inevitably characterized by
a mix of weak-form departmentalism and judicial review. It is
therefore not realistic to condemn or demand categorically independent constitutional judgment by the executive branch. More
168

Judicial review has hence been used historically to invalidate state or local enactments that fell out of step with the political projects of national political coalitions
in the early Republic, see Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Supreme Court and the American
Elite, 1789−2008, at 58 (2009) (summarizing Marshall Court jurisprudence as “nationalistic, circumscribing the states while untethering the federal government”), and in
the civil rights era, see Kevin J. McMahon, Reconsidering Roosevelt on Race: How
the Presidency Paved the Road to Brown 96−176 (2004) (describing how Roosevelt
managed to steer the appointment of pro-civil rights judges through Congress and explaining that the “arguments and strategies that . . . laid the foundational precedent
for later Supreme Court decisions constitutionally undercutting southern democracy
and white supremacy” were first made by the Justice Department “in the course of
prosecuting crimes”); accord Mark A. Graber, Constructing Judicial Review, 85 Ann.
Rev. Pol. Sci. 425, 435 (2005).
169
Jide O. Nzelibe & Matthew C. Stephenson, Complementary Constraints: Separation of Powers, Rational Voting, and Constitutional Design, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 617,
640 (2010). The model concerns the interaction of Presidents and Congress. The
point, however, is generalizable.
170
Whittington, Political Foundations, supra note 162, at 136.
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tailored inquiry into specific forms of departmentalist practice such
as enforcement-litigation gaps is instead needed.
III. ASSESSING THE CONSEQUENCES OF ENFORCEMENT-LITIGATION
GAPS
How then do enforcement-litigation gaps stack up as “constitutional constructions”? Are they a “realistic best practice”171 that executive branch officials ought to deploy more frequently than they
do at present? Or should the practice be discouraged, even marginalized, more than it is today? To reach a considered judgment
on the practice of distinguishing enforcement from litigation positions, it is necessary to ask whether the practice—intrinsically and
independently of the underlying law in question—has net harmful
or beneficial consequences. Because the effects of distinguishing
enforcement from litigation defense may be hard to untangle from
the merits of a specific statute, it is also useful to frame the question in a rule-utilitarian spirit: how would a sustained practice of
distinguishing enforcement from litigation decisions influence constitutionally salient policy outcomes?
This Part pursues that evaluation of enforcement-litigation gaps
by considering the downstream positive and negative consequences
of their routinized use. That quasi-rule-utilitarian framework provides a basis on which to determine what presumption a conscientious executive branch official should invoke when deciding
whether to distinguish enforcement from a litigation position. My
methodological assumption here is that the conscientious official
will be guided by a kind of rough constitutional consequentialism,
which takes account of what can loosely be called costs and benefits denominated in terms of policy goals enumerated in the Constitution.172 The resulting presumption—which again, to be clear,

171

Morrison, Stare Decisis, supra note 8, at 1456−57.
That is, I assume that the text of the Constitution establishes certain goals, such
as promoting democracy, maximizing liberty, and extinguishing tyranny, and then ask
how the persistent use of enforcement-litigation gaps would contribute to such goals.
The aim of the analysis is to capture the constitutionally salient effects of enforcement-litigation gaps independent of the substantive merits of the laws at stake. And
my use of the terminology of cost-benefit analysis is not meant to introduce a welfarist perspective into the analysis. I do not, that is, assume that the Constitution’s goal
is simply to maximize social welfare.
172
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might be displaced by the equities of a given case—reflects a judgment about how iterative recourse to enforcement-litigation gaps
will, over either a short or long term, influence constitutional goals
in either a desirable or negative way. It would operate as a “realistic best practice” default.
This analysis, aiming to identify executive branch best practice,
is warranted because official federal policy respecting enforcement-litigation gaps is not at present crisply articulated. Department of Justice memoranda reflect considered views on the question whether to enforce all or some federal laws, but do not clearly
speak to the question when to separate enforcement from defense
decisions. The government clearly rejects Edward Corwin’s view
that the executive has an obligation to defend all federal statutes.173
Rather, legal opinions from the Department of Justice stipulate a
trigger for nonenforcement decisions.174 But the same memoranda
say little about decisions to not defend federal laws beyond vague,
hortatory disclaimers that the Department usually defends federal
laws in court.175
To be sure, the Department is consistently clear that it will take
heightened care respecting the prerogatives of the executive under
Article II of the Constitution.176 It is also clear that the President
173

See Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 1787−1957, at 66 (4th
ed. 1957).
174
See, e.g., Dellinger Memo, supra note 148, at 200 (“If . . . the President, exercising
his independent judgment, determines both that a provision would violate the Constitution and that it is probable that the Court would agree with him, the President has
the authority to decline to execute the statute.”). The Civiletti memo speaks of the
duties of “defending and enforcing the Act of Congress,” but does not explain precisely when those duties fall away. Civiletti Memo, supra note 148, at 55.
175
Cf. Letter from Andrew Fois, Assistant Attorney General, to the Hon. Orrin G.
Hatch (Mar. 22, 1996), reprinted in 1 J. L. (1 Pub. L. Misc.) 19, 28 (2011) (“There exist
no formal guidelines that [government] officials consult in making [decisions to not
defend laws].”); Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 1073, 1078
(2001) (“[T]he Solicitor General generally defends a law whenever professionally respectable arguments can be made in support of its constitutionality. Unlike litigation
decisions in other cases, when an Act of Congress has been challenged, the Solicitor
General ordinarily puts a heavy thumb on the scale.”).
176
See Meltzer, supra note 12, at 1199 (“The strong tradition of defending acts of
Congress . . . does not extend to separation-of-powers cases—at least not to those that
involve a conflict between legislative and executive powers.”). Both the Department
of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) and the Solicitor General take the position that the executive branch has more latitude for active disapproval of congressional matters on structural constitutionalism grounds than on other questions of con-
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has substantial control over Justice Department litigation positions.177 But as to when it is acceptable to not defend a law there is
silence.178 Worse, currently available legal materials fail to supply a
general framework for evaluating enforcement-litigation gaps.
It is important to flag at the threshold that the following analysis
rests upon two further simplifying assumptions. First, I treat both
the decision to enforce and the decision to defend a law as binary
matters, not questions of degree. Within the executive, the degree
to which a legal rule is enforced is often a function of many different factors, including the allocation of enforcement resources, the
priorities of departmental chiefs, and the extent of political capital
the President is willing to expend on that rule. With a few exceptions, it would be possible to treat enforcement of almost any federal law as a continuous variable rather than as a binary matter.
Complicating matters further, it is possible to imagine a continuous
measure of the executive’s felt commitment to defending a law. For
example, in the case of DOMA Section 3, the Justice Department
might underscore its unconstitutionality in every case. Or it might
simply decline to defend the law wholesale. Or it might decline to
stitutional law, such as the individual rights provisions of the Bill of Rights. See
Dellinger Memo, supra note 148, at 201 (“The President has enhanced responsibility
to resist unconstitutional provisions that encroach upon the constitutional powers of
the Presidency.”); Civiletti Memo, supra note 148, at 55–56 (accepting a duty to “defend and enforce the Acts of Congress” but cautioning that “if that equilibrium has
already been placed in jeopardy by the Act of Congress itself” especially on separation of powers grounds, that duty falls away); see also The Constitutional Separation
of Powers Between the President and Congress, 20 Op. O.L.C. 124, 128 (1996) (noting
that “the executive branch has an independent constitutional obligation to interpret
and apply the Constitution,” which is “of particular importance in the area of separation of powers”); Recommendation that the Dep’t of Justice not Defend the Constitutionality of Certain Provisions of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, 8 Op. O.L.C. 183, 194–95 (1984) (describing an executive duty to
enforce and defend except where a statute impinges on executive authority); The Attorney General’s Duty to Defend and Enforce Constitutionally Objectionable Legislation, 43 Opp. Att’y Gen. 55, 57 (1980) (same). The same pattern holds for the Solicitor General. See Days, Solicitor General, supra note 32, at 79−81 (noting that
“Solicitors General have always sided with the President in disputes over the constitutionality of congressional attempts to circumscribe presidential power. . . . [They] will
not defend a statute . . . [they] determine[] . . . is patently unconstitutional”).
177
Stephen S. Meinhold & Steven A. Shull, Policy Congruence Between the President and the Solicitor General, 51 Pol. Res. Q. 527, 527 (1998).
178
There is a vague reference to a duty to defend except in “exceptional circumstances” in one Department of Justice Opinion. Constitutionality of Legislation Establishing the Cost Accounting Standards Board, 4B Op. O.L.C. 697, 698 (1980).
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defend the law only in those circuit courts of appeal in which sexuality-based classifications have been held to be subject to strict
scrutiny—or, as it has done, in those circuits that might so hold.
Treating enforcement and defense as continuous variables, however, would inject considerable complexity into the analysis. It
would be necessary to generate a comprehensive taxonomy of potential instances of nonenforcement and nondefense, and to rank
them in order of importance. The result would be an analytically
intractable morass. Accordingly, I simplify and focus on the more
tenable binary matter of whether or not the White House has directed that a law be enforced or defended.
Second, to claim that there are costs and benefits from a government practice such as enforcement-litigation gaps is to assume a
baseline against which costs and benefits are measured. As a baseline, the government might enforce and defend, or instead it might
do neither. Depending on what default posture the government
takes, dividing enforcement from litigation might have different effects. To ground the following analysis, I take the officially stated
practice of the Department of Justice, as explained above,179 as my
baseline. I thus assume that the executive enforces and defends a
law unless the President “determines both that a provision would
violate the Constitution and that it is probable that the Court
would agree with him, the President has the authority to decline to
execute the statute,” and that the executive is more likely to take
this position on Article II questions of executive branch authority.180 In what follows, I will take care to note how this assumption
interacts with identified costs and benefits, such that a cost or
benefit is likely or unlikely to be observed in practice.
A. The Case Against Enforcement-Litigation Gaps
To obtain a threshold sense of possible arguments against using
enforcement-litigation gaps, consider a somewhat intuitive account
of why the practice might strike some as problematic. Viewing the
practice, a naïve observer might be struck that enforcementlitigation gaps require the government simultaneously to take two
contrary and mutually exclusive attitudes to a question of constitu179
180

See supra sources cited in note 176.
See, e.g., Dellinger Memo, supra note 148, at 200.
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tional law. That perception of dissonance may foster uncertainty
about the status and stability of federal law—and a concern that
the links that seem to bind those empowered with formal insignia
of national authority are in fact illusory chains. The same prospect
of government bifurcation may also trigger a concern that political
actors are trying, so to speak, to have their cake and eat it too—
clawing out the political benefits of hewing publicly to the Constitution in the courts, while eschewing the practical and political
costs of really defying Congress. Hence, a chief executive tells
some component of a party base that he is being faithful to the
Constitution by declining to defend an unconstitutional law, even
as continued enforcement of that law inflicts the very harms that
the president has recognized as unconstitutional. The naïve
nonlawyer might even be struck by a yet more cynical thought:
Surely enforcement-litigation gaps are merely sops to the legal
elite, who are comforted by the assurance that important public
policy issues remain within the domain of the federal courts (and
hence within the purview of their guild), while the White House
recklessly and callously ignores those impacted by the putatively
unconstitutional law. Our naïve observer might wonder whether
the rule of law can be purchased so cheaply and on the backs of
those who can least afford it.
This section aims to formalize these intuitive criticisms to enforcement-litigation gaps into two sets of general objections. It focuses on the fact that enforcement-litigation gaps are unusual insofar as they generate a perception of dissonant federal government
practice. First, I identify a cluster of “expressive,” or communicative, effects that may arise from the government’s dissonant bifurcation of deed and word. The practice of distinguishing enforcement from litigation defense communicates to constitutional rights
holders that their entitlements are less valuable, and hence imposes
a demoralization cost and undermines trust in federal authority.
Dissonance between deed and litigation position also exacerbates
the deep credibility problem that has long been known to bedevil
the enforcement of constitutional precommitments.181 Second, I argue that the dissonance implicit in enforcement-litigation gaps
blurs the lines of accountability for constitutional decisions so as to
181

See infra text accompanying note 195.
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distort public deliberation and promote undesirable misconceptions about how the Constitution is operationalized today. Specifically, the practice misleads the public about the political foundations of judicial review and fosters a flawed concern about
countermajoritarian judicial action. Both sets of costs, I note,
largely apply to enforcement-litigation gaps without regard to the
underlying constitutional question or the baseline course of action
the government would otherwise have taken. They are necessary
costs of the dissonance that arises whenever the government splits
a law’s enforcement from its defense.
1. The Expressive Effects of Enforcement-Litigation Gaps
The first cost of bifurcation flows from the “expressive” effects
of enforcing a law that the President or Attorney General has
stated is unconstitutional. Expressive effects can arise from perceptions of government action when the public presumes that government officials “selec[t] actions that, against the background of social norms, express meanings appropriate to [their] purposes and
goals.”182 Decisions by the agents of the state “not only bring about
certain immediate material consequences but also express . . . values and attitudes.”183 A law or an action by an executive official can communicate to the public, for example, that the
state has made a decision on “negative” and “inappropriate”
grounds,184 or alternatively on positive and appropriate ones. So defined, the concept of “expressive effects” can be criticized for its
imprecision and manipulability. But empirical studies demonstrate
that individuals routinely draw normative inferences from the behavior of state agents and that those inferences influence private
decisions in consequential ways. For example, there is a large body
of empirical literature showing that public compliance with the law
and cooperation with law enforcement are products of normative

182

Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 591,
597 (1996).
183
Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive
Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. Legal Stud. 725, 726 (1998).
184
Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1503, 1527−30 (2000).
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judgments by the public, and that these judgments in turn rest on
normative evaluations of state actors’ observed behavior.185
Enforcement-litigation gaps have two potentially significant expressive effects that may undermine public confidence in the Constitution. Such support is typically assumed to be valuable because
diffuse public support is necessary for the maintenance of constitutional norms on the ground, especially given the Supreme Court’s
weak implementation authority and the inconstant incentives of
the political branches to engage in constitutional enforcement.186
The first negative effect relates to the expected value of a constitutional right and results in demoralization and trust costs. The second relates to public confidence in constitutional rules, which are
more apt to be seen as worthless parchment barriers. Both of these
costs arise because of the dissonant character of the enforcementlitigation gap, which requires officials to say one thing and do another. As a result, they largely arise without regard to whether the
baseline of official conduct is defined as “enforce and defend” or
“do not enforce or defend.”
a. Demoralization and Trust Costs
As a threshold matter, a decision to enforce but not defend a
constitutionally suspect law not only impacts those against whom
the law is enforced but also has wider negative repercussions. A rational holder of a constitutional right sees an enforcementlitigation gap as an instance of the executive recognizing her entitlement and nevertheless disregarding it. She learns that even official recognition that a core constitutional right has been violated
may not suffice to induce executive branch forbearance. At least
when it comes to constitutional entitlements, talk appears cheap
and action too costly for government officials. Even governmental
recognition of a right, she realizes, will not suffice to ensure the
right is honored on the ground. She therefore rationally discounts
185
For a summary of this work, see Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law
(2006).
186
Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 Yale L.J. 153, 221 (2002) (“[M]any commentators made the point that judicial power ultimately depended upon popular acceptance.”); see also Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public
Support for the Supreme Court, 36 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 635, 637 (1992).
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the value of her constitutional entitlement. She thereby suffers a
demoralization cost.187 In this way, an enforcement-litigation gap
may be accompanied by a potentially large set of externalities that
sound in public confidence and support for the Constitution.
The Dornan Amendment illustrates how this diminution of constitutional faith may even induce undesirable behavioral changes.188
Enforcement of the Dornan Amendment by the Clinton administration after a public statement about its unconstitutionality would
likely have had a demoralizing effect on HIV-positive Americans.189
The Dornan Amendment communicated that their contributions to
maintaining the nation’s security were irrelevant or would be discounted even by sympathetic officials. This in turn would discourage some citizens from acquiring skills or entering career paths in
which they would contribute to national security. Or it might discourage those who already have relevant skills, such as linguistic
capacities, from taking up public service.190 From a social perspective, such demoralization may be undesirable.
These examples of demoralization costs take as a baseline the
expectation of “neither defend nor endorse.” But demoralization
costs also arise when the baseline is “enforce and defend.” That is,
demoralization costs may arise when the executive declines to defend a law among the part of the public that believes the law to be
187
See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1214−15 (1967)
(introducing the idea of demoralization costs with respect to owners when property is
condemned, and others who believe as a consequence that their property is less secure).
188
See supra Subsection I.B.3.
189
Do public statements from the White House really impact the morale and confidence of interest groups in ways that matter in social welfare terms? Consider one response to President Obama’s May 9, 2012, announcement that he personally supported same-sex marriage: “The president’s role in this is really circumscribed. One
interview doesn’t make a difference. And then I watched the interview and the tears
flooded. There is something about hearing your president affirm your humanity that
you don’t know what effect it has until you hear it.” Andrew Sullivan on Obama’s
Support of Gay Marriage, All Things Considered (Nat’l Pub. Radio May 9, 2012),
available at http://www.npr.org/2012/05/09/152367863/andrew-sullivan-on-obamassupport-of-gay-marriage.
190
Cf. Dan Eggen, FBI Agents Still Lacking Arabic Skills, Wash. Post, Oct. 11, 2006,
at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/
10/AR2006101001388.html (discussing the FBI’s “continued struggle to attract employees who speak Arabic, Urdu, Farsi and other languages of the Middle East and
South Asia”).
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constitutional and had expected the law to be enforced and defended.191 Not only has the executive made an undesirable and erroneous policy choice from this perspective, it has done so in a suspect way by enforcing the law in a way that, from one perspective,
seems to invite invalidation. The disappointed expectations of
DOMA Section 3 supporters might be counted as an undesirable
externality from the Obama administration’s enforcementlitigation decisions.192 It is true that this group would also have been
disappointed had the government declared that it would neither
enforce nor defend. But the manner in which a law is subtly undermined by executive nondefense may undermine public confidence in a fashion quite independent of the (likely limited) effects
of nondefense.
Anticipating demoralization costs, executives may also engage in
strategic mitigating behavior. This behavior may be undesirable to
the extent it involves dissembling and misleading voters in order to
vitiate subsequent political costs. For instance, it is possible to
imagine that demoralization costs will not arise if rights holders’
expectations of constitutional compliance are low from the start.
This might well be said to be the case for DOMA Section 3. Samesex couples and their supporters may have had such low expectations of the Obama administration before Attorney General
Holder’s February 2011 decision on DOMA Section 3 that no demoralization occurred. Harnessing this observation, a canny executive can always mitigate demoralization costs by signaling falsely to
rights holders ex ante that it does not intend to recognize an entitlement. The putative rights holders adapt their preferences in light

191
By contrast, Daniel Meltzer accurately points out “[t]he executive, if it refused to
defend or enforce [DOMA § 3], would not be violating anyone’s constitutional
rights.” Meltzer, supra note 12, at 1189. It is not clear that all relevant constitutional
costs, however, are captured in a pure calculus of rights.
192
To be sure, one might fairly question, from a normative perspective, whether being disappointed when others receive a benefit should be equated with learning that
one’s own constitutional rights are less valuable. That is, one might think that some
kinds of demoralization costs should be weighted more heavily than others. I see no
way to distinguish the positive and negative effects of an enforcement-litigation gap
on supporters and detractors of a law without taking a view on the substantive merits
of the law itself, which by stipulation is outside the bounds of the analysis. I also see
little reason to expect that the effects upon supporters and detractors of a given law
will simply wash out.
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of this behavior.193 Subsequent recognition in theory but not in fact
may then be viewed as cause for celebration. The executive, in
short, will manipulate its messaging in ways that reduce demoralization costs, but only by inflicting harm to the government’s overall
transparency and trustworthiness.194
The expressive costs of enforcement-litigation are not exhausted
by disappointed expectations. A core element of an enforcementlitigation gap is the appearance of internal inconsistency between
the government’s deeds and its statements. There is a significant
body of empirical research demonstrating that dissonant government action of this kind has a cost denominated in public trust, and
even compliance with the law, without regard to the default position government would otherwise take. This research suggests that
it is common for people to evaluate institutions, including governmental entities, not solely on the basis of the goods they produce,
but also on the basis of whether they behave in a consistent, neutral fashion. “Neutrality means that decisionmakers are honest,
impartial, and objective, and that they do not allow their own personal values and biases to enter into their decisionmaking calculus . . . .”195 Negative evaluations generate distrust, and make it
more difficult for the relevant institutions to elicit cooperation or
compliance from individuals. Trust-based legitimacy is directly correlated to the cost and success of public action. Strikingly, this result is found in studies at the transnational level, at the national
level (focusing on national political institutions), at the level of institutions that interact on a daily basis with people (such as police
and local government), and even within complex organizations and
bureaucracies. These findings suggest that governments, which are
constantly striving to elicit cooperation and compliance with ordinary laws and constitutional rules, are well served avoiding practices that evince inconsistency and thereby engender distrust.

193

Cf. Jon Elster, Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality 109, 125–33
(1983) (defining “adaptive preferences”).
194
There is a possibility, however, that if presidents use enforcement-litigation gaps
only to enable judicial resolution of constitutional questions, demoralization costs will
not emerge. But there are distinct problems with justifying the practice as a means to
enable judicial review. See infra Subsection III.A.1.b.
195
Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal
Courts, 63 Hastings L.J. 127, 136 (2011).
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The link between behavioral consistency and public trust in organizations is manifested in a surprisingly broad array of studies
conducted at very different scales.196 To begin at the largest scale,
one leading global study of legitimacy and public trust in government finds that the “inclusive and respectful” character of states is
the best predictor of states’ political legitimacy.197 This result is
somewhat opaque—is there a definition of respectfulness shared
from San Francisco to Xinjiang?—but more granular studies in the
American context find trust to be a function of the “procedural justice” of state actors,198 and in particular the “consistency” of official
action.199
Theorists of state legitimacy suggest that people care about consistency because it provides them with important confirmatory information about within-group status.200 That is, when there is uncertainty about status and belonging within an institution,
manifestations of consistency can quiet such fairness-based concerns. The resulting linkage between behavioral consistency and
positive attitudes toward an institution has been identified empirically in a variety of contexts. For example, a recent study of public
attitudes toward the Supreme Court found that support for the rule
of law is one of the best predictors of support for the courts.201 Another empirical study conducted in the early 1990s similarly found
that “judgments about the Court’s neutrality are central to evaluations of the legitimacy of the Court’s decisionmaking procedures.”202 Similarly, a series of studies of public attitudes toward po196
Robert J. MacCoun, Voice, Control, and Belonging: The Double-Edged Sword
of Procedural Fairness, 1 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 171, 173 (2005) (noting that the link
between procedural justice and legitimacy has been identified in “dozens of social,
legal, and organizational contexts”).
197
See Bruce Gilley, The Right to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy 44
(2009).
198
See Tyler, supra note 185, at 57–68 (demonstrating connection between legitimacy and compliance with the law).
199
Id. at 120, 163–64 (emphasizing neutrality).
200
See Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in Groups,
25 Advances in Experimental Soc. Psychol. 115, 116–17, 124–37, 144–62 (1992).
201
James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Citizens, Courts, and Confirmations:
Positivity Theory and the Judgments of the American People 59 (2009) (reporting results of a multiple regression on loyalty to the U.S. Supreme Court).
202
Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43
Duke L.J. 703, 798 (1994).

HUQ_BOOK

2012]

9/3/2012 8:07 PM

Enforcing ‘Unconstitutional’ Laws

1057

lice similarly find consistency and fairness are central to maintaining trust and legitimacy.203 One form of consistency that matters,
and that has received extensive treatment in the literature, is the
equal treatment of individuals regardless of race or ethnicity.204 But
the vast empirical literature on procedural justice is not limited to
racial distinctions, and instead has investigated and identified the
salience of several other forms of inconsistency and perceived unfairness in state action.205 Finally, it is worth noting that even within
an institution such as government, consistency matters. Recent research shows that even within organizations, “authorities and institutions that exercise[] authority fairly and that communicate[] sincere and benevolent intentions encourage[] their members to
develop supportive dispositions”206 that in net facilitate that organization’s success.
These findings are of more than academic interest. Social theorists as far back as Max Weber have emphasized that states must
generally rely on legitimacy, rather than coercion, to induce practical compliance with the laws.207 For example, a series of studies of
police efforts to elicit cooperation in counterterrorism policing ef-

203

For surveys of these studies, see Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and
Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6
Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 231, 270–71 (2008); Tom R. Tyler & Yuen J. Huo, Trust in the
Law: Encouraging Public Cooperation with the Police and Courts (2002). For recent
examples, see generally Jacinta M. Gau & Rod K. Brunson, Procedural Justice and
Order Maintenance Policing: A Study of Inner-City Young Men’s Perceptions of Police Legitimacy, 27 Just. Q. 255 (2010); Lyn Hinds, Youth, Police Legitimacy, and Informal Contact, 24 J. Police & Crim. Psychol. 10 (2009); Tom R. Tyler, Procedural
Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 Crime & Just. 283 (2003).
204
See generally Tom R. Tyler & Cheryl J. Wakslak, Profiling and Police Legitimacy: Procedural Justice, Attributions of Motive, and Acceptance of Police Authority, 42 Criminology 253, 260 (2004) (citing studies that examine the importance of race
in police profiling and reactions to it).
205
See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 Int’l J. Psychol. 117, 117–18 (2000) (emphasizing, inter alia, the rule of neutrality in eliciting legitimacy and trust).
206
Tom R. Tyler, Why People Cooperate: The Role of Social Motivations 167
(2011).
207
Max Weber, On Law in Economy and Society 336 (Max Rheinstein ed., Edward
Shils & Max Rheinstein trans., 1954) (noting that “every domination . . . always has
the strongest need of self-justification through appealing to the principles of legitimation”); id. at 341 (describing legitimacy as prestige resting on beliefs of members of a
political community); accord Tom R. Tyler, Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: The
Benefits of Self-Regulation, 7 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 307, 309 (2009).
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forts—something of potentially large social value—have demonstrated that the fairness and consistency of state action makes a
significant difference to rates of cooperation among both minority
groups and also members of the majority ethnic or religious population.208 If consistency and fairness influence individual behaviors
toward the state even in the high-stakes context of terrorism, it
seems likely that in lower-stakes contexts, evaluations of legitimacy
predicated on perceptions of consistency and fairness will have a
large effect on willingness to cooperate or comply with the state.
These studies, to be sure, are not directly applicable to enforcement-litigation gaps, which have never been studied empirically
because of their infrequency. But the studies are still suggestive.
They point to the importance of consistency in official action as a
condition precedent of public trust and support. They also suggest
that incoherent action or inconsistent treatment damages public
support for the state and its policies. Enforcement-litigation gaps
are nothing if not exemplars of inconsistency, even invitations to
cognitive dissonance. As such, it is plausible to expect that they will
sap, albeit gradually and incrementally, important public support
for the Constitution and the institutions tasked with defending it.
This slow leakage of public support, even if it operates only at the
margin, surely counts as a serious cost attendant to the use of enforcement-litigation gaps.
b. The ‘Parchment Barriers’ Problem
The second class of downstream expressive effects from enforcement-litigation gaps relates to the credibility of constitutional
rules as constraints on government. This is the problem of parchment barriers: The dissonance necessarily embedded in enforcement-litigation gaps is a reminder that powerful political actors can
choose when and if to heed supposedly entrenched constitutional
rules. As James Madison famously observed, structural legal constraints on governmental conduct are mere “parchment barriers.”209
208

See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Tom R. Tyler & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Why Does the
Public Cooperate With Law Enforcement?: The Influence of the Purposes and Targets of Policing, 17 Psychol. Pub. Pol. & L. 419 (2011); Tom R. Tyler, Stephen Schulhofer & Aziz Z. Huq, Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counterterrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim Americans, 44 L. & Soc’y Rev. 365 (2010).
209
See The Federalist No. 48, at 309 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
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Because there is “nothing external to society” to enforce constitutional rules,210 designers of constitutions must fashion institutional
structures to channel the incentives of majorities and powerful political actors toward constitutional self-enforcement. The challenge
is exacerbated by a “dead hand” effect.211 This is the resentment
people may feel because they are governed under rules promulgated by long-dead generations.212 Dead hand effects further undermine the intrinsic felt authority of constitutional rules. Even
though the U.S. Constitution suffers especially acutely from these
problems, “Madison never explained why constitutional rules related to structure and process would be any stronger or more secure than rules forbidding particular substantive outcomes.”213
Weak parchment barriers are thus an endemic problem in the U.S.
constitutional system.
The difficult task of maintaining fragile parchment barriers is
imperiled by the dissonance created by enforcement-litigation
gaps. High-salience decisions by the government to comply with
statutory commands the government’s own lawyers say are unconstitutional suggest to the public that constitutional rules do not
really impose strong constraints on government action. The bifurcation of enforcement and litigation decisions instead yields a memento mori of constitutional order—a reminder that the whole edifice of constitutional government might rest on the transient
preferences of powerful government actors. Enforcement-litigation
gaps are unusual in this regard: There are not many other circumstances in which a government acknowledges a constitutional prohibition and then openly and flagrantly acts contrary to that rule. If
the prospect of constitutional violation undermines public confidence in the Constitution, and thus diminishes its expected lifespan, it stands to reason that conceded violations will have an even
greater corrosive effect. That perception may also have harmful
downstream effects. Transnational studies of how constitutions en-

210
Jon Elster, Ulysses Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommitment, and Constraints 95 (2000).
211
See generally Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 606, 609 (2008) (elaborating problem).
212
Elster, supra note 210, at 95.
213
Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional
Commitment, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 657, 663 (2011).
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dure over time have concluded that the likelihood of a constitution’s enforcement is correlated with the willingness of political actors to refrain from breaching the constitutional deal.214 That is,
visible nonenforcement increases the likelihood of breach by other
parties to the deal.
More generally, enforcement-litigation gaps might be undesirable because they undermine confidence in a version of the rule of
law. At their core, enforcement-litigation gaps involve the adoption by government officials of mutually inconsistent positions respecting a law: do this, say that. It has long been recognized that
consistency in the application of the laws is a constitutive element
of a thick version of the “rule of law.”215 Enforcement-litigation
gaps induce skepticism concerning the willingness of officials to
conform to the rule of law. There is some evidence of this effect in
the wake of the Holder decision not to defend DOMA Section 3.
Some Republican Senators expressed dismay at Holder’s decision
not to defend on the ground that the failure undermined their confidence in the stability and predictability of the law.216 Partisan criticism, of course, cannot always be taken at face value. But it does
suggest that at least some politicians critical of Holder believed
that members of the public would also perceive and be concerned
by the deed-word inconsistency at the heart of the enforcementlitigation gap; otherwise, the form of their public protests is hard to
understand.
In sum, enforcement-litigation gaps are undesirable because of
downstream effects on the perceived efficacy of constitutional
rules. Currently, enforcement-litigation gaps are used so infrequently that their marginal contribution to public perceptions of
the Constitution is relatively small in magnitude. But recall that the
question pursued here is rule-utilitarian and not act-utilitarian in its
basic approach. In that light, what presently are ephemeral expres-

214

See Zachary Elkins et al., The Endurance of National Constitutions 76−78 (2009).
Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 36 (2d. ed. 1969) (listing “consistency” as part
of the rule of law). This was recognized historically, for example, in the development
of the Administrative Procedures Act, which was designed to ensure “uniformity and
consistency in the application of law.” Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and
Administrative Law in the Gilded Age, 119 Yale L.J. 1362, 1367 (2010).
216
See sources collected supra note 10.
215
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sive effects may compound, causing tangible harm to confidence in
the Constitution.
2. Accountability for Constitutional Decision Making
A second species of cost attendant to enforcement-litigation
gaps concerns the public’s perception of who is accountable for
compliance with constitutional rules. This cost arises when there is
a disruption of clear lines of accountability for constitutional decisions. By raising the costs to the public of tracing responsibility for
constitutional enforcement—and indeed by misdirecting public attention—enforcement-litigation gaps make constitutional compliance more difficult to elicit.217
a. Blurring the Lines of Constitutional Accountability
An implicit premise of the enforcement-litigation gap is that it is
the courts, not political branch actors, who are responsible for vindicating constitutional norms. On this view, judicial settlement of
constitutional law is not only useful and publicly acceptable but
necessary. Use of an enforcement-litigation gap suggests to the
public that in the absence of judicial benediction, the political
branches stay their constitutional judgment and comply with rules
they believe unconstitutional. But this is not wholly accurate for
two separate reasons. First, as explained in Section II.B, political
branch actors in our system have significant independent responsibility for the enforcement of constitutional rules. In the first decades of the Republic, “Congress and the executive resolved a
breathtaking variety of constitutional issues great and small.”218 To
this day, constitutional issues occupy a nontrivial amount of con-

217
Accountability has a constitutional valence. The Supreme Court has indicated on
several occasions that maintaining clear lines of accountability is constitutionally important in distinct institutional contexts. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3155 (2010) (warning that “diffusion of power
[to control federal agencies] carries with it a diffusion of accountability”); New York
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1992) (discussing loss in accountability when
voters cannot distinguish effects of federal and state policy choices).
218
David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period, 1789−1801,
at 296 (1997).
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gressional committees’ time.219 There is also a rich tradition of constitutional interpretation by and within the executive branch.220
Second, judicial review itself is a product of sustained political
investment for all the reasons canvassed in Section II.C. There is,
to be sure, a kernel of truth to the intuition that judicial enforcement of constitutional rules is undemocratic. Judges, at least on the
federal bench, are insulated from short-term political tides and
hence able to promulgate rulings that diverge from the electorate’s
immediate preferences.221 Yet an exclusive emphasis on the countermajoritarian character of judicial action in a mapping of accountability for public policy decisions risks dangerous oversimplification. Judicial enforcement of constitutional norms against both
state and federal statutes is the result of deliberate long-term investments by interest groups, politicians, and bureaucrats.222 It
emerges because public officials and organized interest groups perceive that constitutional norms are easier or cheaper to enforce
through the courts than via democratic legal mandates. It arises, in
other words, because of and not in spite of democratic political
forces.
Viewed in this light, enforcement-litigation gaps may be undesirable to the extent that they elicit a false belief in an absolute
separation of national politics and constitutional law. This belief
enables politicians to evade accountability for their ultimate complicity in the constitutional outcomes of judicial action. At the
margin, the bifurcation of enforcement from litigation thereby
yields an insalubrious mystification of the political foundations of
judicial review. It promotes a vision of constitutional responsibility
that occludes the proper responsibility of elected actors and dimin-

219

Keith E. Whittington, Neal Devins & Hutch Hicken, The Constitution and Congressional Committees: 1971−2000, in The Least Examined Branch: The Role of Legislatures in the Constitutional State 396, 409–10 (R.W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds.,
2006).
220
See generally Morrison, Stare Decisis, supra note 8, at 1470−75.
221
See Richard Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010
Sup. Ct. Rev. 103, 143–49 (arguing that changing political conditions, including the
increasing frequency of divided government, and waning presidential ambitions increase the political space available to the Court).
222
See Whittington, Political Foundations, supra note 162, at 103−60 (cataloguing
reasons for, and examples of, political actors favoring judicial resolution of a policy
question).
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ishes the public’s ability to hold representatives accountable for the
full range of consequences of their actions.
To the extent they are invoked with the claim that they facilitate
judicial review of controversial constitutional issues—an argument
taken up and considered in more detail below—enforcementlitigation gaps are further undesirable because they suggest that it
is courts alone that limit democratic government through application of constitutional precommitments. The practice thereby feeds
the pernicious accusation that constitutional constraints are “undemocratic”223 by diverting attention away from the ways courts instead channel popular views on the Constitution.224 We might go
further and object that the countermajoritarian critique enabled by
enforcement-litigation gaps also draws attention away from nonmajoritarian elements of our national electoral system225 and the
distortions of national political outcomes provoked by growing
wealth and income inequalities.226 By casting the courts as countermajoritarian, in short, the enforcement-litigation gap promotes a
distorted and inaccurate understanding of the national political system in ways that hinder the operation of public accountability.
Perhaps one should not make too much of relatively infrequent
enforcement-litigation gaps as catalysts of public beliefs about a
separation between majoritarian politics and undemocratic courts.
223
See Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at
the Bar of Politics 16−17 (1978) [hereinafter Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch].
Bickel’s criticism arose in the context of general discontent with the Warren Court.
See Barry Friedman, The Will of the People: How Public Opinion Has Influenced the
Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution 256−58 (2009).
224
For a case study of how a popular movement can influence the Court’s reading of
the Constitution, see Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 191, 222−25 (2008).
225
See Robert A. Dahl, How Democratic is the American Constitution? 41−55
(2002) (comparing, unfavorably, the democratic pedigree of national elections in the
United States with those of other countries); Sanford V. Levinson, Our Undemocratic
Constitution: Where the Constitution Goes Wrong (And How We the People Can
Correct It) 25−77 (2006).
226
Professor Larry Bartels’s careful quantitative study concludes that “affluent people have considerable clout, while the preferences of people in the bottom third of the
income distribution have no apparent impact on the behavior of their elected officials.” Larry M. Bartels, Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New
Gilded Age 285 (2008); see also Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, Winner-Take-All
Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer—and Turned its Back on the Middle
Class 41−72 (2010) (describing political construction of economic inequality over the
past four decades).
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It may be, after all, the case that the public already misunderstands
the allocation of constitutional responsibility, so the marginal effect
of enforcement-litigation gaps will be small. But it is still plausible
to posit not only that the practice at issue here involves an especially powerful signal of the division of constitutional labor between courts and the political branches, but also to fear that increased use of enforcement-litigation gaps would have ramifying
mystification effects. That is, accountability concerns are a powerful reason not to expand use of the practice, even if accountabilityrelated effects are but dimly felt now.
b. Separating the Costs and Benefits of Constitutional Fidelity
There is a second accountability problem in the use of enforcement-litigation gaps. It reflects the intuition that the practice allows
the President to score political points while externalizing costs to
another actor. This “rough without the smooth” intuition might be
elaborated by observing that enforcement-litigation gaps allow
Presidents to leverage their disproportionate control over channels
of public communication to claim credit for taking a stand on constitutional questions of salience to their base. At the same time,
they delay any uptake of the costs of a stance until those costs can
be shared with the federal courts.
Since the presidencies of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow
Wilson, Oval Office occupants have wielded powerful tools that
enable them to “go over the heads of Congress,” as well as the
Court, and instead appeal directly to the American public.227 When
effective, Presidents have broad power to frame initiatives and set
the terms of debate. This asymmetric control can be employed to
maximize the gains and dilute the costs of enforcement-litigation
gaps.
Take the DOMA Section 3 decision by way of example (although the argument is generalizable). In February 2011, President
Obama claimed credit for advancing a version of equal protection
conducive to his base while complying with the rule of law. Supporters of gay rights praised his decision, while opponents con227
Jeffrey K. Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency 4 (1987); see generally George C.
Edwards III & Stephen J. Wayne, Presidential Leadership: Politics and Policy Making
123−46 (8th ed. 2010).
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demned it.228 Presidential control of the announcement’s timing and
the ability to coordinate supportive voices made the White House’s
positive message more powerful than countervailing voices. But if
DOMA Section 3 is later invalidated—a decision that, if it occurs,
is most likely some time away—President Obama may no longer
be in office. Even if still in office, he can frame that result as the responsibility of the federal courts. When he ceases to enforce
DOMA Section 3, he can resist criticism on the ground that he is
simply complying with a court order insofar as he fears a political
backlash.229 That is, the circumstances of nonenforcement mean the
President can share blame with the courts, even though he has already taken significant credit ex ante. In this way, Presidents can
exploit their powerful bully pulpit and the time lag in judicial review to maximize political gain with core constituencies while partially externalizing political costs onto federal courts. For an
elected official to monopolize praise and evade blame is unexceptional. But presidential credit-claiming and blame-deflection may
still be a concern when its side effect is the sapping of federal
courts’ public credibility as a coequal branch.230
In sum, the practice of distinguishing enforcement from litigation has costs to stability, confidence, and accountability values
that the Constitution is thought to promote. These costs are typically orthogonal to the constitutional value in dispute in a particular instance. They apply, that is, whether the question is same-sex
228

Charlie Savage & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, In Turnabout, U.S. Says Marriage Act
Blocks Gay Rights, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 2011, at A1 (quoting one commentator to
the effect that the “decision may have bought the president some time with gay rights
leaders”).
229
Why do interest groups that favor nonenforcement not condemn the President
when the enforcement-litigation gap is announced, and thereby reduce his political
gain? The interest groups with the greatest interest in calling the President’s bluff—
gay-rights groups—are likely to stay their hand in the hope that they can persuade the
President to neither enforce nor defend the law. That is, the best informed segment of
the President’s coalition has an incentive to not fully inform other parts of the coalition that may be paying less attention to sexual orientation rights issues. In this way, a
President can leverage the informational heterogeneity of his coalition.
230
A potential response to this argument would turn on the observation that Presidents have contributed to the viability of judicial review in the first instance because it
was a vehicle for achieving their ends. That Presidents would continue to do so is
hardly a surprise. But this response is not quite satisfying insofar as it does not address the “sweet without the bitter” point or the concern about inaccurate blameshifting.
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marriage or the fight against Communism. They are also largely
independent of the baseline practice of the executive; that is, they
accrue whether the executive would otherwise enforce and defend
a law, or whether it would decline to stand behind the law either on
the ground or before the bench.
Identifying downsides, however, does not end discussion about
the practice. These costs create a burden of justification on those
who would promote enforcement-litigation gaps in general. They
make the question whether there are countervailing gains that
could underwrite the practice all the more pressing. I turn to that
question now.
B. In Defense of Enforcement-Litigation Gaps
What then is there to be said in favor of enforcement-litigation
gaps? This section develops two arguments in support of distinguishing between the enforcement and the defense of a federal law.
First, as intimated above, executive officials who have engaged in
or defended the practice have suggested a “justiciability” benefit.
These officials point out that enforcement-litigation gaps allow
suits pressing the alleged constitutional flaw in a statute to proceed,
and contend that expeditious judicial resolution of the legal question would promote valuable certainty. This assumes that courts
are more favored, or at least less controversial, forums for the settlement of constitutional questions than, say, the Justice Department’s OLC. Notwithstanding the political foundations of judicial
review, there may indeed be reasons in some cases for preferring a
judicial settlement (assuming, that is, no obfuscation of political accountability). Second, the nonenforcement decision has a set of
costs sounding in executive self-dealing that decisions about litigation defense do not. These costs relate to a longstanding fear of an
executive power to dispense with statutory commands on the basis
of disputed and controversial constitutional grounds. Bifurcation is
a way of honoring the Constitution while avoiding these costs.
Based on these benefits I believe that it is incorrect to assert, as
two recent commentators have boldly and categorically proclaimed, that “[t]here is no plausible argument that the Constitution obliges the President to press constitutional claims that he
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finds unpersuasive or objectionable.”231 There are, in fact, a number
of plausible arguments, albeit ones that arguably prevail in only a
fraction of cases.
Both of the benefits I delineate here are most likely to arise if
the default for executive action is nonenforcement and nondefense
of a law. Given the baseline executive practice on this score at present, in other words, they are more likely to arise in cases concerning Article II values. This fact conveniently resonates with another
asymmetry. The benefits of enforcement-litigation gaps turn out to
have a quite different distribution than its costs. This is because the
two reasons developed here in favor of distinguishing enforcement
from litigation choices do not apply with equal strength to all constitutional questions. Rather, they do not attach to laws implicating
individual rights guarantees of the Constitution, while they do attach to laws implicating structural separation of powers principles.
As a result, the current default practice of the Department of Justice in respect to when a law will be neither defended nor enforced
means that the usage of enforcement-litigation gaps will tend to coincide with the class of cases in which the practice has benefits—
i.e., those cases concerning Article II values where the baseline for
executive action is nonenforcement and nondefense. As a consequence of these dynamics, I conclude that given the present institutional status quo, the case in favor of enforcement-litigation gaps is
strong when there is an Article II question at stake, but weak when
there is an individual entitlement in play.
Before developing the two arguments in favor of enforcementlitigation gaps, it is worth explaining the distinction between structural principles and individual rights that permeates the analysis.
For sophisticated readers, the distinction may seem naïve or implausible. They might object that the individual entitlements in the
Bill of Rights are “tightly interconnected” with the structural design of the Constitution.232 Individual entitlements in the 1787
Philadelphia text have structural ramifications. The bill of attainder
231

Devins & Prakash, supra note 17, at 510.
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131,
1132−33 (1990). For an originalist argument that due process entitlements should be
understood as instantiations of the separation of powers, see Nathan S. Chapman &
Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 Yale L.J. 1672
(2012).
232
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rule233 applied in United States v. Lovett has been characterized as a
form of structural protection because it divides legislative and executive authority.234 Access to habeas corpus as guaranteed in the
Suspension Clause235 is intended both to promote individual freedom and to ensure executive compliance with the law.236 The Supreme Court routinely echoes Madison’s dictum that structural
principles such as the separation powers redound to the benefit of
individual liberties by fragmenting and restraining government
power.237 If “[l]iberty is always at stake when one or more of the
branches seek to transgress the separation of powers,” then the judicial vindication of structural principles cannot be untangled from
judicial enforcement of individual rights. 238
No doubt there is some truth to this. But the common purpose
shared by rights and structure, however, does not make a distinction between the operation of rights guarantees and Article II
structural principles infeasible. My argument rests on the premise
that rights guarantees and structural principles might pursue similar goals but they do so through different strategies and mechanisms, distinct constituencies, and divergent incentive structures.
Given these differences, constitutional constructions can plausibly
be hypothesized to have different effects on rights and structural
principles. At least as a first cut, it is plausible to analyze and un-

233

U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
Comment, The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach to
the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 Yale L.J. 330, 343−48 (1962) (connecting the Bill of
Attainder Clause and separation of powers).
235
U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2; see also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401−02 (1963) (explaining habeas’s “function [as providing] a prompt and efficacious remedy for whatever society deems to be intolerable restraints”).
236
See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301, 303−04 (2001) (explaining the writ as a
“means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention”); Nancy J. King & Joseph L.
Hoffman, Habeas for the Twenty-First Century: Uses, Abuses, and the Future of the
Great Writ 11 (2011) (“[H]abeas provides a remedy for individuals, but it is a remedy
that, at its core, serves to address fundamental problems with institutions of government.”).
237
See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380−81 (1989); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S.
833, 859−60 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also The Federalist No. 47, supra
note 209, at 302−05, 308 (James Madison) (exploring the relationship between “the
structure of the federal government” and “liberty”).
238
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
234
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derstand the two categories separately—as I do with respect to
each of the potential benefits considered in this Subsection.
1. The Argument from Justiciability
The creation and preservation of a justiciable controversy is a
goal routinely stipulated in official defenses of enforcementlitigation gaps. In explaining the decision to enforce but not defend
DOMA Section 3, Attorney General Holder thus contended that
such a course of action “respects the actions of the prior Congress
that enacted DOMA, and . . . recognizes the judiciary as the final
arbiter of the constitutional claims raised.”239 Similarly, one of the
reasons given for the decision to enforce but not defend the 1996
Dornan Amendment was the need to give courts “an opportunity
to resolve” the constitutional question.240 More generally, the Department of Justice has long identified the “special role” of the Supreme Court “in resolving disputes about the constitutionality of
enactments.”241 In that vein, it has consistently cautioned against
“deny[ing] the Supreme Court the opportunity to review” constitutional questions.242
At first blush, the notion that the executive branch’s default attitude to constitutional settlements reached by the federal courts
would be one of deference seems counterintuitive. In one of the
most famous arguments in constitutional law, Professor Alexander
Bickel raised concerns about the fragility of judicial resolutions of
nationally contested constitutional questions.243 If, as Bickel suggested, there is a “natural qualitative limit” to judicial remediation

239

Holder Letter, supra note 3, at 3.
Quinn-Dellinger Briefing, supra note 55, at *3.
241
Dellinger Memo, supra note 148, at 200; accord Waxman, supra note 175 (noting
the courts’ “historic function of judicial review,” and contending that the executive
does and should respect the latter).
242
Dellinger Memo, supra note 148, at 201.
243
Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress 94 (1978)
[hereinafter Bickel, Supreme Court and Progress] (“The Court’s effectiveness, it is
often remarked, depends substantially on confidence, on what is called prestige.”); see
also Cass R. Sunstein, Backlash’s Travels, 42 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 435, 439 (2007)
(“Bickel argued that the Supreme Court maintained a kind of Lincolnian tension, and
that it did so through the use of the passive virtues, by which it stayed its own hand in
deference to anticipated public resistance.”).
240
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of constitutional wrongs,244 deliberate delegation by the executive
to the courts appears counterproductive, a recipe for constitutional
underenforcement. Other scholars have posited that the executive
has access to superior information to identify, and greater capacity
to remedy, infringements upon “underenforced” constitutional
norms.245 These institutional competence concerns count in favor of
more, not less, executive enforcement of constitutional rules. Nor
can it be argued that court-ordered constitutional solutions are
necessarily more stable than political ones. Both political and judicial coalitions change over time. It is an empirical question which is
more volatile.
Yet it is still possible to conclude that these concerns do not undermine the case for securing some judicial settlement by enforcement-litigation gaps. As developed in Part II, the political branches
have willingly acceded some authority to the federal courts to settle constitutional questions. It is possible they did so with good reason. Judicial resolution of constitutional questions may be valued
due to its effects on public beliefs about constitutionalism. Public
confidence in the stability and credibility of constitutional norms
may grow when such norms are perceived to be the work of apolitical and expert judges rather than politicians fleetingly in possession of high office. Constitutional law may then be construed as
law not politics.246 Federal judges may also be more likely to be
seen as “republican schoolmasters”247 with a tutelary function that
the public accepts.248 Provided that politicians do not obscure their
ultimate responsibility for the consequences of judicial review, that
is, there are sound reasons for thinking that some quantum of effective judicial supremacy may be desirable.
244
Bickel, Supreme Court and Progress, supra note 243, at 94; see also Bickel, Least
Dangerous Branch, supra note 223, at 115 (arguing that justiciability constraints
“lead[] to sounder and more enduring judgments”).
245
For a development of the notion of an underenforced constitutional norm, see
Sager, supra note 140, at 1213−20.
246
Of course, this begs the larger question of why law would be more respected than
politics. I assume there is an intuitive answer, but I pretermit what seems to me a hard
question.
247
This was a role that early federal judges cultivated. See Ralph Lerner, The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 Sup. Ct. Rev. 127, 177−80.
248
For a case study of how the Court can influence public opinion, see Valerie J.
Hoekstra & Jeffrey A. Segal, The Shepherding of Local Public Opinion: The Supreme
Court and Lamb’s Chapel, 58 J. Pol. 1079, 1079, 1096−97 (1996).
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Nondefense may further these same ends. Supplementing the
status quo preservation effect of continued enforcement, an executive branch decision to not defend a law may convey information to
the federal courts that enables more effective judicial review. For
example, nondefense may signal the absence of cogent justifications for a measure, which may be relevant to whether the law can
survive rational basis scrutiny. Nondefense thereby facilitates the
delicate judicial task of parsing the factual credibility of possible
legislative justifications for a law. An executive decision not to defend is also politically costly (although not as costly as nonenforcement).249 By incurring some costs, the executive signals that
the constitutional values at stake are not trivial.250 Nondefense further signals that at least one political branch will support a judicial
holding of unconstitutionality, mitigating some of the enforcementrelated concerns that preoccupied Bickel.
A related but independent justification for enforcementlitigation gaps turns on the prospect of legislative rather than judicial remediation. It could be argued that continued enforcement of
a constitutionally suspect law is desirable because absent the
shadow of implementation Congress has no incentive to repeal a
statute.251 The prospect of the Dornan Amendment’s impending enforcement, for example, may have motivated Congress to undo
that measure.252 To be sure, members of Congress may be under
constituent pressure to change a law even if it is not being enforced. But they must still overcome collective action and transaction costs in the lawmaking process. An executive decision to enforce maximizes the probability of successful congressional action
even when some legislators would otherwise be willing to act.
The justiciability argument developed here has assumed that enforcement, not nonenforcement, creates the adversity necessary for
litigation. But this is not always so. There are many different con249
Waxman, supra note 175, at 1088 (“Any decision not to defend the constitutionality of an Act of Congress tests the mettle of the Solicitor General. That is as it should
be.”).
250
See generally Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard
Look” Judicial Review, 58 Admin L. Rev. 753, 755 (2006).
251
See Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement, supra note 22, at 55.
252
According to then White House Counsel Jack Quinn, the President committed to
do “everything we can . . . to reinstatement [sic] in the event that separation procedures are started.” Quinn-Dellinger Briefing, supra note 55, at *6.
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sequences that flow from an enforcement-litigation gap. In the legislative veto context, for example, the Attorney General first raised
the justiciability concern as a reason for not enforcing a legislative
veto of education-related regulations.253 Nonenforcement might
have led to some entities being denied federal funds, which would
have allowed them to challenge the executive’s action in federal
court.254
The justiciability argument developed here also obviously assumes that judicial settlement of constitutional uncertainty is desirable. This proposition is controversial. As developed above, there
are plenty of forceful arguments against the allocation of constitutional settlement to the courts.255 Hence, it is worth stressing that
accepting the justiciability argument described here does also mean
accepting that some judicial settlement of constitutional questions
has value.
2. When Does the Justiciability Argument Apply?
The justiciability argument has greater force when Article II
values are at stake than when individual rights guarantees are at
risk. This is so for two main reasons, which both demand some development and defense.
First, an enforcement-litigation gap is less likely to be warranted
in individual rights cases than in respect to Article II matters because continued enforcement of a federal law is less likely to be
necessary to ensure judicial resolution of rights questions as opposed to questions of constitutional structure. Consider the equal
protection questions raised by the Dornan Amendment and
DOMA Section 3. There are at least fifty other entities (the states)
that might enact rules with similar classifications. States can (and
do) enact measures that in fact distinguish same-sex couples from

253
Constitutionality of Congress’s Disapproval of Agency Regulations by Resolutions Not Presented to the President, 4A Op. O.L.C. 21, 29 (1980).
254
For an example of a case in which the denial of funds created Article III standing,
see Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 436 (1998).
255
For a summary of arguments against judicial responsibility for constitutional matters, see generally Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review,
115 Yale L.J. 1346 (2006).
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opposite-sex couples in ways that raise equal protection concerns,256
and that could precipitate judicial resolution of some (if not all) of
the basic doctrinal questions raised by DOMA Section 3.257 There
are also thousands of counties, municipalities, and other governmental entities that could do the same. Like the federal government, states and substate governmental units are prohibited from
enacting bills of attainder.258 The issue in Lovett might then have
been decided by adjudication of a state enactment analogous to
Section 304 of the Urgent Deficiency Appropriations Act. Most
individual legal entitlements vested by the federal Constitution apply to both the federal government and the states.259
By contrast, the same argument can never be made in respect to
the constitutional questions raised by the legislative veto,260 the
line-item veto,261 or Comptroller-General supervision of deficit
spending.262 There is no state-level analogue to these Article IIrelated disputes in federal constitutionalism. Absent continued enforcement by the executive of a problematic law, it may well be
that the underlying constitutional issue is never resolved in court.
The marginal expected epistemic value of judicial review of a constitutionally dubious federal enactment that is enforced but not defended is therefore greater in the Article II context than in the individual rights context.
It is no response to this point to say that there is a loss in informational or precedential value from adjudication of a constitutional question when raised by state rather than federal action. The
Court has recently stressed that rights protections “are all to be enforced against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards that protect those personal rights
against federal encroachment.”263 Even in the class of cases in
256

See Sonia Bychkov Green, Currency of Love: Customary International Law and
the Battle for Same-Sex Marriage in the United States, 14 U. Pa. J.L. & Soc. Change
53, 108−22 (2011) (listing all fifty states’ provisions on same-sex marriage access).
257
See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003–04 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
258
States are prohibited from enacting bills of attainder under U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 10, cl. 1.
259
See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3030−36 (2010) (canvassing
debates about incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the states).
260
See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 930−31 (1983).
261
See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 426 (1998).
262
See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 732−34 (1986).
263
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3034 (citing Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964)).
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which state and federal governments might muster different policy
justifications in defense of a particular measure by dint of their peculiar responsibilities, resolution of the constitutionality of a state
enactment at least provides some information about the status of a
federal enactment.264 For example, the Warren Court developed
the law of equal protection respecting race by adjudicating state
statutes, and its results were transposed largely without litigation to
the federal context.265 Continued enforcement of a federal law in
order to provide a foundation for a lawsuit is thus less justified in
those cases where state or municipal substitutes for resolution of
the underlying legal question exist. This is likely to be true in many
individual rights cases.266
There is a second reason for thinking the justiciability arguments
apply differently when it comes to Article II structural questions
and individual rights issues. A neutral judicial forum is especially
valuable when a constitutional dispute pits one political branch
against another. In such cases, there is a greater possibility than
usual that political branch efforts at “negotiation and accommodation” will end in “stalemate.”267 Interbranch stalemates are less
likely in individual rights cases, which do not systematically pit the
institutional interests of Congress against those of the executive.
Disputes about the balance of congressional and executive power
will therefore benefit disproportionately from judicial settlement
because there is a greater possibility that they would not be otherwise resolved, and that the equilibrium result could be continued

264

For example, “traditions” that provide a basis for state interests may operate differently at the state and federal levels. See Kim Forde-Mazrui, Tradition as Justification: The Case of Opposite-Sex Marriage, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 281, 301−08 (2011).
265
Cf. Richard A. Primus, Bolling Alone, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 975, 978–80 (2004)
(exploring the early application of equal protection rules, which were initially developed in respect to the several states, not to the federal government). Similarly, final
merits resolution of the Proposition 8 case may not resolve the constitutionality of
DOMA § 3, but it can supply significant additional information.
266
My claim is not, to be clear, that a state or municipal substitute will always be
available or that a challenge to a state or municipal action will finally resolve the constitutional question. It suffices that these conditions are sometimes met to show that
judicial resolution of separation of powers questions (which is impossible in cases arising from the states) is more valuable in expectation than rights-related adjudication.
267
Comm. on Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53,
92−93 (D.D.C. 2008) (describing how an interbranch stalemate justified judicial intervention); accord United States v. AT&T, 551 F.2d 384, 390−91 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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uncertainty and costly interbranch bickering. All things being
equal, therefore, a judicial settlement may be valuable because it
mitigates friction at least among the political branches.
To amplify this argument from judicial neutrality, it might be observed that the federal law-making process of bicameralism and
presentment is more likely to yield laws with relatively difficult Article II questions and relatively easy individual rights questions.
From an ex ante perspective, the expected epistemic value of judicial settlement of the former is greater than the expected value of
judicial settlement of the latter. To see this, notice that the federal
law-making process involves both branches, and creates ample opportunities for the expression of structural constitutional concerns.
In particular, the executive influences the law-making process via
its power of persuasion, its agenda-setting power,268 and its party allies in Congress.269 Presidents can keep laws that raise Article II issues off the legislative agenda entirely, or head off those issues via
the bill comment process.270 As Justice Department opinions show,
executive branch lawyers are especially alert to Article II concerns.271 A separation of powers question that persists through the

268

See James L. Sundquist, The Decline and Resurgence of Congress 127−54 (1981);
see also Vasan Kesavan & J. Gregory Sidak, The Legislator-in-Chief, 44 Wm. & Mary
L. Rev. 1, 48−55 (2002) (arguing on originalist grounds that this power is vested by
Article II of the Constitution).
269
See The Legal Significance of Presidential Signing Statements, 17 Op. O.L.C. 131,
135−36 (1993) (describing routine executive involvement in the law-making process).
Based on the degree of intraparty fragmentation at any given moment, this can be a
more or less useful avenue of influence. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard A. Pildes,
Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2311, 2332−38 (2006).
270
See Morrison, Stare Decisis, supra note 8, at 1463; accord Pillard, supra note 18,
at 711−12.
271
See, e.g., Dellinger Memo, supra note 148, at 201 (“The President has enhanced
responsibility to resist unconstitutional provisions that encroach upon the constitutional powers of the Presidency.”); Civiletti Memo, supra note 148, at 56–57 (distinguishing laws that trench on Article II values and concluding that Presidents have a
reduced obligation to honor and defend such enactments); Jackson, supra note 157, at
1358 (quoting President Franklin Roosevelt’s statement that “I deem it an imperative
duty to maintain the supremacy of that sacred instrument (the Constitution) and the
immunities of the Department entrusted to my care”). But see Daryl J. Levinson,
Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 915, 920
(2005) (arguing that officials often act based on personal and political incentives that
do not entail defending institutional powers and prerogatives of the branch that employs them). For an illuminating example of how substantive views can change upon
moving from Congress to the White House, see David E. Lewis, Presidents and the
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lathe of bicameralism and presentment is more likely to be particularly intractable simply because it has not been resolved at any of
the numerous decision points at which political actors had both incentives and opportunity to address it. It follows that these questions are likely to be particularly well-suited for resolution by a
neutral third-party—that is, the federal courts.
This is less likely to be the case for individual rights questions. It
is more likely that an individual rights concern will simply go unremarked in the bicameralism and presentment process (and it is
certainly not impossible for such problems to be created legislatively through sheer inattention).272 Individual rights holders are
not per se represented in the legislative process. Whether their interests are represented in the consideration of a particular bill depends on the political circumstances of the moment.273 Rightsrelated implications of a law are more likely than not to result from
inadvertence. The executive may then have means to address such
concerns without an enforcement-litigation gap. It can, for example, seek legislative reconsideration or clarification. Or it can interpret and apply a statute by prioritizing the constitutional value
over nonconstitutional policy concerns.274 The expected marginal
value of an enforcement-litigation gap in rights cases is diminished
by the availability of such substitutes. Moreover, empirical work
suggests that members of Congress are most likely to step in to fill
in the gap left by executive nondefense in structural cases. A study
of congressional amici curiae found that about one-third of cases in
which legislators intervened involved structural issues of executive
prerogatives or the separation of powers.275 This bolsters the infer-

Politics of Agency Design: Political Insulation in the United States Government Bureaucracy 1946−1997, at 21−22 (2003) (discussing Harry Truman’s changing views).
272
Note that the argument here is not that individual rights concerns will never be
addressed or considered in the legislative process. The argument is comparative: that
they are less likely to be considered than structural constitutional questions.
273
Congress, to be sure, has at times demonstrated great solicitude respecting individual entitlements. Indeed, some have argued that statutory protections of civil
rights, voting rights, and equality values play a more important role in our constitutional system. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 94, at 6−22.
274
The canon of constitutional avoidance takes precedence over Chevron deference.
See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S.
159, 172−73 (2001).
275
McLauchlan, supra note 88, at 82 (drawing data from figure 3.1).
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ence that individual rights questions are more likely than structural
questions to be unattended by legislators or the executive.
Two objections to this last point are worth considering. First, it is
often posited that a core function of judicial review is the protection of individual rights.276 From that perspective, it seems rather
perverse for courts to prioritize structural matters over individual
rights questions. The perceived priority of rights in American constitutional jurisprudence, however, may be illusory. It has long
been clear that even at its acme, litigation-focused judicial investments during the civil rights era did not result directly in large
gains in civil rights on the ground,277 and when gains did eventually
emerge in the wake of judicial interventions, they are better ascribed to the investments of social movements or the national political branches.278 More recently, Supreme Court decisions that
seemed to vindicate liberty in the teeth of new national security
demands have in fact had exiguous real-world consequences.279
However comforting it is to think of the federal courts as bastions
of individual liberty, it is by no means clear that their reputation in
this regard is warranted. Accordingly, there is no reason to prioritize rights over structural issues.
The second objection builds on the observation that the fraction
of separation of powers disputes that are justiciable is relatively
small, due in part to the political question doctrine.280 By contrast,
the fraction of individual rights cases that can be resolved in fed276

See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review,
121 Harv. L. Rev. 1693, 1705 (2008) (“[I]t would seem to me to be dramatically imprudent for a society that thought its legislature did not currently take rights seriously
to abolish judicial review in hopeful anticipation that the legislature would thereafter
change its ways.”).
277
See Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social
Change? (1991); accord Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero?
Rethinking the Warren Court’s Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1361, 1365 (2004).
278
See Kevin McMahon, Reconsidering Roosevelt on Race 150–76 (2004) (exploring
the Roosevelt Justice Department’s efforts setting the ground work for a legal assault
on segregation).
279
See Aziz Z. Huq, What Good is Habeas?, 26 Const. Comm. 385, 402–05 (2010)
(representing empirical evidence to the effect that Supreme Court intervention in
military detentions at Guantánamo has failed to have any significant libertarian effect).
280
Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1513, 1516 n.9 (1991).
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eral court is reasonably large because political question objections
arise less frequently. There are accordingly a larger volume of individual rights questions amenable to federal court resolution.
Hence, the latter are more important to resolve. But the relative
frequency of justiciable disputes in the structural and the rights
domains is orthogonal to the question whether judicial settlement
of a particular dispute is valuable. Rather, the political question
may narrow the class of Article II questions to which the justiciability argument applies, but it does not mitigate the basic asymmetry between the two kinds of cases. Provided a law raises a justiciable separation of powers question, the executive has reason to
enforce but not defend it.
3. The Anti-Dispensation Argument
There is a second justification for bifurcating enforcement from
litigation defense of a federal law. An executive decision not to enforce a law has costs that a decision to not defend a law does not.
Nonenforcement, even upon constitutional rather than policy
grounds, carries a risk of executive branch self-dealing that nondefense does not. These costs are more pronounced when the legal
basis of nonenforcement relates to the President’s Article II powers. They are less so when an individual right is at stake. The conscientious, principled executive branch lawyer therefore has
greater cause to have recourse to an enforcement-litigation gap
when structural constitutional questions are in play. This might be
called the “anti-dispensation” argument for enforcement-litigation
gaps because it is based on the view that the executive should not
have a power, loosely akin to that of the Stuart monarchs, of “dispensing” with legislative commands, even on constitutional
grounds. It resonates with longstanding concerns that the executive
branch has accumulated an asymmetric share of federal power over
the past century, and that mechanisms must be found to cabin its
authority.
The anti-dispensation concern, like the justiciability argument, is
aired in OLC legal opinions, although it has not been linked explicitly to enforcement-litigation gaps. Justice Department lawyers instead explain their reluctance to decline either to enforce or to defend federal statutes on anti-dispensation grounds. In 1980,
Attorney General Civiletti highlighted the risks of nonenforcement
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to “the equilibrium established within our constitutional system.”281
Fourteen years later, Assistant Attorney General Dellinger emphasized how interbranch comity concerns conduced to a presumption “that enactments are constitutional,” and therefore must be
both enforced and defended.282 Former Solicitor General Drew
Days has similarly underscored his belief in a “general duty to defend congressional statutes against constitutional challenges.”283 In
declaring the Obama administration’s position on DOMA Section 3, Attorney General Holder echoed the same sentiment.284 Unfortunately, none of them considered whether the antidispensation concern that animates these comments applies differently to nonenforcement and nondefense of federal law.
This is an unfortunate lacuna, for the anti-dispensation argument
does apply differently to nonenforcement and nondefense decisions. We see this by considering first the argument in the context
of nonenforcement. The core of the anti-dispensation concern invoked by Civiletti, Dellinger, and Days is a worry about perceived
concentrations of excessive power in the executive branch.285 A
central aim of the U.S. Constitution’s architecture is to diffuse
power across different institutions in order to prevent “[t]he accumulation of all powers,” which the Framers believed to be “the
very definition of tyranny.”286 Concentrations of power are undesirable, on the Framers’ view, because they deprive some constituencies of a blocking veto against government action and thereby
make deprivations of valuable liberties more likely.287 Maintaining
a plurality of representative agents who speak for overlapping but
nevertheless distinct constituencies allows the people to induce
competition between those agents and thereby lower the agency
costs of representative government.288 Motivated by these concerns,

281

Civiletti Memo, supra note 148, at 56.
Dellinger Memo, supra note 148, at 200 (recommending “great deference” to
Congress).
283
Days, Solicitor General, supra note 32, at 79.
284
Adam Liptak, The President’s Courthouse, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 2011, Wk5.
285
Hence, anti-dispensation concerns are triggered by institutionally self-regarding
motives, but not by the pursuit of mere partisan gain.
286
The Federalist No. 47, supra note 209, at 293 (James Madison).
287
Id. (describing separation as an “essential precaution in favor of liberty”).
288
See Tom Ginsburg & Eric A. Posner, Subconstitutionalism, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1583,
1597−98 (2010).
282

HUQ_BOOK

1080

9/3/2012 8:07 PM

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 98:1001

the Constitution splits federal power between a law-making branch
and a law-execution body, and it bars the law-crafting Congress
from direct enforcement of the laws.289 As a correlative, it vests the
President with authority to implement but not write laws.290 Downstream, federal courts are constrained from acting absent a justiciable case or controversy.291 The intended result is, at least putatively, a benevolent dispersion of authority.
All of these concerns are starkly presented by presidential decisions to enforce or not enforce a law. The anti-dispensation argument is based on a concern that presidential discretion to act or refuse to act without a legislative mandate on constitutional grounds
will wrench out of joint the delicate interbranch balance—a concern that simply does not apply with as much force in the litigation
defense context.292 A dispensation power enables the executive to
pick and choose between the laws it enforces. Such presidential
power to defy the legislature is inconsistent with generally understood historical understandings of the Constitution, and would instead resemble in important ways the “dispensing” power repudiated by American constitution makers.293 In contrast, decisions not
to defend a law do not suggest that the executive has the authority
to hunt though the U.S. Code and exercise discretion over which
provisions to follow or enforce.
The possibility of presidential dispensation respecting enforcement decisions also creates costs for the public and Congress. Stability and predictability are typically seen as desirable characteristics of the rule of law.294 They enable planning and foster the
confidence necessary to sustain investment. But a broad executive
power to second-guess the legality of congressional enactments
289

U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (prohibiting federal bills of attainder).
Id. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed . . . .”).
291
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
292
Cf. Ginsburg & Posner, supra note 288, at 1588 (“Concerned that politicians motivated by ambition might seek to aggrandize their power, Madison suggested that the
problem could be ameliorated through careful institutional design.”).
293
For an account of the English practice, see Carolyn A. Edie, Tactics and Strategies: Parliament’s Attack upon the Royal Dispensing Power 1597−1689, 29 Am. J. Legal Hist. 197−99 (1985). For the American response, see Prakash, The Executive’s
Duty, supra note 16, at 1651−55.
294
Neil K. Komesar, Law’s Limits: The Rule of Law and the Supply and Demand of
Rights 156−57 (2001).
290
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creates uncertainty for the public, who can no longer simply look
to the statute books to determine which laws are sound. On the
legislative side, nonenforcement may “dilute the [legislators’] sense
of constitutional responsibility,”295 creating a moral hazard problem. Legislators’ incentives to pay heed to constitutional implications of the laws will at the margin wither if they believe that executive officials are trolling the statute books for constitutional
problems. The result will be the enactment of more unconstitutional laws, and less time devoted to notionally worthwhile, lawful
legislative projects.296 Again, these consequences do not flow so obviously from nondefense of a law.
While anti-dispensation arguments apply strongly to nonenforcement decisions, they bear only weakly on nondefense decisions. A refusal to defend a federal law either raises none of the
aforementioned concerns, or at most raises them to a lesser degree.
The refusal to defend, standing alone, may disrupt the ordinary
flow of the litigation process, forcing another party to step into the
breach to defend a law. But it does not intrinsically pose a risk of
self-dealing.297 Nor does it automatically concentrate power in the
executive’s hands. To the contrary, it may invite a judicial ruling
against the government that may limit official discretion (at least in
some cases). Nor does the decision to not defend a federal statute
strip Congress of its constitutional power to enact laws: the legislative work product, after all, is still being enforced. The antidispensation argument thus applies with far greater force to decisions to not enforce a law than to decisions to not defend a law. As
a result, it provides a justification for the decision to bifurcate en295

Adrian Vermeule, Judicial Review and Institutional Choice, 43 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 1557, 1561 (2002). The feedback argument was initially made in James Bradley
Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7
Harv. L. Rev. 129, 131 (1893).
296
For an argument that such incentive effects will in fact rarely arise, see Peter L.
Strauss, The President and Choices not to Enforce, 63 L. & Contemp. Probs. 107, 122
(2000). The empirical validity of the point, however, is less important than the observation that the Constitution has allocated responsibility for constitutional consideration in a particular way, and it is inappropriate to adopt constitutional constructions
for the purpose of disrupting that design in ways that lower the aggregate quantum of
constitutional deliberation in the system.
297
This is not to say it is unimaginable that a decision to not defend could be motivated by narrow interest-group lobbying. It could, but there is no reason to think such
refusals will systematically be best explained on those grounds.
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forcement decisions from litigation defense decisions. An executive
branch lawyer wishing to honor the Constitution, but sensitive to
anti-dispensation concerns, could plausibly reason that an enforcement-litigation gap provides a means to honor a constitutional
concern without creating a hazardous institutional precedent.
These anti-dispensation arguments could be parried with four
objections—none of which are in the end availing. First, it could be
posited that the Constitution is designed to pit ambition against
ambition.298 The plenary exercise of independent presidential
judgment on constitutional matters might on this basis be thought
to be consistent with this goal of promoting interbranch conflict.
But the fact that the Constitution’s design envisages some degree
of presidential solicitude for the Constitution does not mean that
all possible forms of that solicitude are equally effective. To the
contrary, the Constitution presumes that ambition in government is
dangerous, and so seeks to place each branch’s ambition in equilibrium with the others’ ambitions. Excessive presidential discretion is
harmful to the Constitution’s balance of powers because it lacks a
corresponding and balancing institutional check.299 It could tip
whatever the balance of power is systematically in favor of Article
II.
Second, it could be argued that the dispensation power can be
limited by allowing a President to disregard federal law solely on
the basis of good faith beliefs about the Constitution.300 A “good
298

The Federalist No. 51, supra note 209, at 319 (James Madison).
Indeed, the costs of a broad nonenforcement power are so great that actual instances of nonenforcement are few and far between. The most famous example of
nonenforcement, which was coupled with nondefense, concerned a restriction on the
President’s removal power. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) (upholding removal of a postmaster without statutorily required advice and consent).
Another domain in which the executive both refuses to enforce and to defend relates
to executive privilege. See, e.g., Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
300
See Prakash, The Executive’s Duty, supra note 16, at 1653 (distinguishing a
presidential duty to disregard unconstitutional laws from the British monarchy’s
power to suspend laws on this ground); accord Devins & Prakash, supra note 17, at
535–37 (arguing, with a nice turn of phrase, that “[t]he Constitution establishes a belt,
suspenders, and rope approach to its defense”). Devins and Prakash do not account
for the possibility that duplicative and potentially redundant devices for constitutional
enforcement of the kind they suggest may have perverse effects at odds with their implicit claim of optimality. It is quite possible, for example, that redundant enforcement technologies will generate excessive enforcement of one constitutional value
299
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faith” disagreement test, however, is unlikely to impose much constraint in practice given the state of our current constitutional jurisprudence. Fundamental and irreconcilable differences about the
core questions of constitutional methodology and application are a
durable trait of American constitutionalism. Two hundred and
twenty years after the Founding, for example, large disagreements
persist about the scope of congressional power.301 Fundamental
rights undergo revolutionary shifts in meaning and application
within the span of a generation.302 Even the concept of separation
of powers remains profoundly unsettled.303 For all intents and purposes, the substance of constitutional law is extremely volatile—
and this quite apart from the persistence of sharp disagreements
about interpretative methodology.304 As a result, limitation of
presidential dispensation power to good faith constitutional disagreements alone is not much limitation at all. It would still permit
the President to disobey an open-ended set of laws.305 There is, in

(e.g., federal authority) and diminish some other value (e.g., states’ autonomy). Optimizing constitutional compliance, that is, is not a simple maximization problem, but
a more complex optimization task.
301
See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (upholding
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, but as an exercise of the Power to
Tax rather than under the Commerce Clause).
302
Compare Claudia Luther, Bork Says State Gun Laws Constitutional, L.A. Times,
Mar. 15, 1989, at B5 (categorically rejecting individual entitlement under the Second
Amendment), with District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (finding such
an entitlement based on an originalist logic initially pioneered by Judge Bork).
303
Compare Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 597 (1984) (arguing that separation of powers principles regulate relations between named heads of each of the
three branches, but leave discretion with respect to subordinate components, such as
agencies), with Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The President’s
Power to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541, 544−49 (1994) (“The Executive Power
Clause actually does what it says it does, i.e., it vests (or grants) a power over law execution in the President, and it vests that power in him alone.” (citation omitted)).
304
As a general matter, it seems to me that the President, acting through the power
to select Justices and to shape public debate from the bully pulpit, also has significant
control over whether certain constitutional claims are plausible or not. If that intuition is correct, it is an additional reason to be leery of allowing a dispensation power
in cases in which the executive branch can proffer merely a good-faith legal argument.
305
Scholars such as Professors Paulsen, Calabresi, and Prakash, who find in the Constitution an executive duty to disregard unconstitutional enactments, have greater
confidence than I do in the disciplining effect of one particular interpretive methodology—original public meaning. Even if I concurred in their methodological commitments, however, I would demur to their confidence in originalism’s disciplining effect.
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sum, a respectable argument that a presidential power to not follow federal statutes on constitutional grounds is costly and undesirably open ended.
Third, the use of enforcement-litigation gaps envisaged here assumes the existence of executive branch lawyers who are motivated
by more than institutional self-aggrandizement and are conscientious about the risks of dispensation. But this is not an implausible
assumption. The Justice Department employs lawyers who typically employ diligence and care in interpreting the Constitution
(albeit with heightened solicitude for Article II values).306 It is
therefore plausible to posit that the enforcement-litigation gap
provides a meaningful option to such lawyers. Indeed, on one reading of the historical record, the practice has come into play precisely when conscientious officials seek to balance competing constitutionally inspired obligations.
A fourth and final argument against the concern with executive
dispensation with the laws challenges the premise that officials
within the executive branch inevitably seek to expand Article II
authority.307 On this account, the Madisonian aspiration of setting
ambition against ambition is flawed because bureaucratic incentives are too dispersed and multidirectional to sustain an interbranch balance. Whatever force this observation has elsewhere, it
is inconsistent with the OLC practice, followed in both Democratic
and Republican administrations, of prioritizing Article II values in
analysis and litigation.308 At least insofar as constitutional law is
concerned, there does appear to be consistent pressure from the
executive aimed at protecting that branch’s domain.309

In my view, the diversity of historical materials and the availability of multiple levels
of generality in originalist interpretation undermine that methodology’s claim to certainty. For examples of how originalism can lead to unexpected results, see Jack M.
Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 Const. Comment. 291, 297 (2007); Jack M.
Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 549
(2009).
306
See Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws, supra note 18, at 1577−79; Morrison,
Stare Decisis, supra note 8, at 1460−70.
307
Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118
Harv. L. Rev. 915, 920 (2005).
308
See sources collected supra note 176.
309
Accord Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, supra note 134, at 1716 n.108.
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4. When Does the Anti-Dispensation Argument Apply?
Anti-dispensation arguments do not apply evenly, however, to
the full spectrum of rights-related and structural constitutional
concerns. Like justiciability concerns, anti-dispensation concerns
instead apply in different ways to structural Article II questions
and to individual rights matters. Following a now-familiar pattern,
they weigh more heavily in the structural constitutional domain
than in the individual rights domain. This is because, in brief, the
concern for self-dealing is more pronounced in regard to Article II
issues than in respect to individual rights claims.
Claims mustered under Article II concern the expansion of institutional authority by the executive. At least in the short term, realization of such arguments necessarily amplifies the authority of
the claimant executive branch official. The same is not systematically the case with individual rights claims. To be sure, some of
those, such as ones implicated by the Dornan Amendment and
DOMA Section 3, may happen to concern employees within the
executive branch. Or they may happen to be relevant to constituencies that are salient to the electoral strategies of a particular
President.310 The executive may therefore benefit politically in a
particular case by not enforcing the relevant law. But individual
rights claims do not typically and systematically bear directly on
the institutional powers of the branches. They do not necessarily
augment the discretion and capacity of executive branch officials.
To the contrary, vindication of an individual rights claim instead
will very often narrow the executive’s policy discretion. For example, presidential positions on the Dornan Amendment and DOMA
Section 3, if accepted, would close off options for administrative
action even absent congressional instructions. The executive would
have to supply more compelling rationalizations for actions that
previously could have been taken without giving overt, let alone
compelling, reasons.
In response to this, it might be argued that self-dealing concerns
can arise in cases involving individual rights insofar as chief executives can use nondefense as a way of currying favor with interest
groups. On that ground, the dispensation concern furnishes reason
310

King James II, for example, employed the dispensation power to aid Catholic
supporters. I am grateful to Professor Prakash for pointing this example out to me.
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to resist nonenforcement in both structural and individual-rights
cases. But an equation of legal and political forms of self-dealing is
unconvincing and perhaps even misleading. There is an important
difference between measures that enhance the permanent institutional authority of a branch and measures that enhance a specific
office-holder’s transient political authority. The former are likely
to be stickier, and hence more worrying, than the latter. Hence, it
is no surprise that institutional self-dealing, and not political selfdealing, has long been the abiding concern of separation-of-powers
law.311 Moreover, if Presidents are barred from political self-dealing
by enforcement-litigation gaps, they have ample substitutes, from
nominations to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to pardons.
If Presidents are barred from legal-institutional self-dealing, they
do not have substitutes. Furthermore, self-help on Article II matters predictably augments the executive’s institutional powers,
while self-help on individual rights matters is likely to diminish the
reach of such powers. If the animating concern behind antidispensation arguments is the possibility of institutional selfdealing by one branch or another, it would seem sensible to worry
less about actions motivated by a concern for the rights of others
than actions motivated by Article II worries.
This asymmetrical distribution is reinforced by the baseline executive branch approach to enforcement-and-defense decisions.
For it is in the Article II-related context that nonenforcement and
nondefense are most likely to be the default approach of the Justice Department. That is, it is precisely in those cases in which the
executive is most likely to adopt a baseline of wholesale resistance
to a law (i.e., neither enforcing nor defending) that the alternative
of enforcing but not defending will have the greatest benefit.
In sum, those who accept the anti-dispensation argument for enforcement-litigation gaps on the ground that it promotes the Framers’ goals of controlling agency costs, limiting self-dealing, and
promoting stability should be cautious in using that tool in respect
to individual rights concerns. Careful analysis of the antidispensation argument reinforces the conclusion drawn in the previous Subsection from study of the justiciability ground: the use of
311

See, e.g., Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654, 691−92 (1988) (focusing on aggrandizement by a branch in institutional terms).
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enforcement-litigation gaps has firmer foundations when the underlying constitutional value in play is structural and rooted in Article II concerns rather than when it emerges from an individual
rights provision.
5. Other Constitutionalism Questions and Enforcement-Litigation
Gaps
What if a matter involves both an individual right and a structural constitutional matter, or a non-Article II structural principle
such as federalism? Consider first a case of overlap. President Clinton’s decision about how to treat HIV-positive members of the
military could have been framed as an exercise of the Commanderin-Chief power or in the alternative as an application of equal protection principles. The same is true in bill of attainder cases. Indeed, in Lovett, the Solicitor General devoted most of his brief to a
separation of powers argument, and only in his closing pages
turned briefly to the bill of attainder question.312 How should cases
of overlap be analyzed? Recall that it is only the benefits of enforcement-litigation gaps that are asymmetric. Every use of the
practice has expressive and accountability costs. Only those instances that involve an Article II question, however, accrue offsetting justiciability and anti-dispensation benefits. If there are both
structural and individual rights questions at play, the justiciability
and anti-dispensation arguments apply with just as much force as if
there was only a structural issue at stake. There is hence no reason
in dual structure-rights cases to disfavor enforcement-litigation
gaps.
By contrast, non-Article II structural constitutional cases—for
example, those implicating federalism concerns—present a closer
case. They fit within the “rights of others” class of cases because
they do not involve a self-dealing benefit to the federal government. But they are also akin to structural cases insofar as they may
be nonjusticiable in the absence of an enforcement-litigation gap.
The justiciability argument, however, is weaker when it comes to
states as opposed to individual rights holders because of states’
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See Lovett brief, supra note 37 passim.
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greater ability to vindicate rights in the political process.313 Given
the presence and influence of the powerful states’ lobby on Capitol
Hill, it is hard to see why the presumption in federalism cases
should favor enforcement-litigation gaps.
C. Summary
This Part has developed a taxonomy of both the advantages and
disadvantages of generalizing and regularizing the use of enforcement-litigation gaps. I have aimed to show that both supporters
and detractors of the practice can draw on reasonable arguments
that sound in our constitutional traditions and values. But the case
for distinguishing enforcement from litigation defense turns importantly on the species of constitutional value in play. The costs I
have identified accrue in every instance of the practice. Its benefits,
however, have a more irregular distribution. They are strongest
(and most likely to occur given background executive branch practice) when the underlying constitutional question is a matter of Article II structural constitutionalism. They are weakest (and also
least likely to arise) when an individual rights matter is at issue.
Hence, there is a case for thinking that enforcement-litigation gaps
should be presumptively favored when there is an Article II issue
in play, and presumptively disfavored for other sorts of constitutional questions.
To be sure, the merits and demerits of enforcement-litigation
gaps identified here are not fully commensurable. They cannot easily be translated into simple dollar values. Reasonable people will
disagree about their importance. But such incommensurability is a
persistent feature of almost all constitutional analysis, a domain in
which multiple and diverse normative considerations are simultaneously in play and in which officials are almost always trying to
satisfice across those disparate goals.314 Here, the incommensurability concern is mitigated by the fact that the arguments point uniformly in one direction: all the costs and none of the benefits ac313

See generally Larry Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 215 (2000). Federalism concerns thus likely
do not warrant enforcement-litigation gaps.
314
Accordingly, I am skeptical that a cost-benefit analysis that accounts only for
harms and goods that can be measured and monetized can capture the full spectrum
of relevant concerns in contemporary constitutional law practice.
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crue when an individual rights question is at issue, while both the
costs and the benefits arise when a structural matter is in play. Accordingly, it is plausible to posit that as a threshold matter, the executive was justified in distinguishing enforcement from litigation
defense in cases concerning structural principles but not in cases
concerning individual rights.
CONCLUSION
So what presumption should Attorney General Holder have applied when considering the use of an enforcement-litigation gap in
respect to DOMA Section 3? From a principled perspective that
accounts for the full range of issues raised by constitutional constructions, the applicable presumption did not favor a decision to
enforce but not defend that provision of federal law.
Strictly speaking, it is beyond the scope of my project here to determine whether the equities of that specific case overcome that
presumption. But for supporters of equal rights for gays and lesbians, I suspect that the case is clear. They might say that without an
enforcement-litigation gap, the Obama administration would have
taken the less desirable tack it did with “don’t ask, don’t tell,” and
continued both to defend and to enforce the law. But was the path
really taken that much better even from the perspective of such a
supporter? I am skeptical that a supporter of same-sex marriage
should have been enthused about what Attorney General Holder
did. Consider again how the bifurcation of enforcement and litigation in respect to DOMA Section 3 advanced equality interests on
the ground—or rather failed to do so. DOMA Section 3 remains
largely in force as of the time of this writing. Those harmed by the
ongoing application of the law obtain little tangible in terms of
changed policies from an administration nondefense decision.315
Those without health coverage remain in the cold. Those excluded
at the border remain in limbo. Plaintiffs in the Second Circuit lawsuits exchanged tepidly motivated Justice Department opposing
counsel for committed and highly skilled counsel acting for Congress. Indeed, the publicity attendant on Attorney General
Holder’s decision may have rendered the discrete use of equitable
315

With the exception of two noncitizens already within the United States, who
benefited from stays of deportation proceedings.
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discretion in the course of enforcing rules even more difficult than
it would have otherwise been. Nor did continued enforcement of
DOMA Section 3 change the likelihood of legislative action, as
might have been the case with “don’t ask, don’t tell.”316 To be sure,
executive nondefense may influence the Supreme Court’s attitude
to the basic constitutional question. But how confidently can
Holder claim that his decision will be decisive in this regard? And
how should that fragile contingency be measured against the certain and grave harms that an opponent of DOMA Section 3 observes racking up even as the White House clambers onto the high
ground?
Viewed with a gimlet eye then, perhaps the Holder decision
should provoke a measure of skepticism even from fervent supporters of same-sex marriage and sexuality-related equality values.
Perhaps it is preferable to be clear-eyed about the fact that the
most tangible winner from the decision was the Obama White
House, which made a politically valuable gesture to its base even as
it left out in the cold many thousands whose constitutional rights it
allegedly continues to violate. That skepticism might swell once it
is noted that the administration also won support from many lawyers, who tend to weight formalist rule-of-law gains from enabling
adjudication heavily and who (as a rule) do not have to bear the
costs of the statute’s continued enforcement. In contrast, what supporters of same-sex marriage within the Obama base really got was
the husk of what they could (and, in some eyes, should) have secured had not the White House shucked off the costs of constitutional fidelity onto the courts in favor of short-term political gain.
It is perhaps not unfair to say that it is only a particularly chilly
kind of legalism, shorn of human sympathies and attachments, that
conduces to wholehearted applause of the White House under such
circumstances.
Compromise will always seem attractive to officials within the
White House wishing to seem the soul of bipartisan moderation.
But inconsistent moderation can be a vice. Sometimes being forced
to choose between extremes forces one to think harder about a
choice than would be the case if a compromise position were avail316

Karen Parrish, President Signs “Don’t Ask” Repeal Act into Law, Am. Forces
Press Serv., Dec. 22, 2010, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle/aspx?id=62213.
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able.317 There is solid ground for thinking that the Obama administration should have resolved a more difficult choice than it did,
and that it should have picked between standing behind DOMA
Section 3 in court and on the ground, or repudiating the law in its
entirety. There is solid ground, that is, for thinking it should have
evinced something more than a tepid fidelity to norms supposedly
basic to our constitutional system.
The Constitution matters if and when it is taken seriously. Eschewing the sweeping and categorical judgments that currently
dominate the departmentalism literature, I have aimed here to get
some traction on what this simple and naïve dictum means by attending to the specifics of particular varieties of departmentalism.
One of these, enforcement-litigation gaps, is costly because it is a
sort of cheap talk about the founding document. Such gaps foster
public skepticism about the credibility of fragile constitutional precommitments. Sometimes the corrosive bifurcation of deeds and
words, and the expressive harms it induces, can be justified in
terms of the harms and difficulties raised by executive defense of
Article II claims. But when it comes to individual rights, the toll of
constitutional cheap talk cannot be justified. When it comes to the
rights of others, the bureaucrats, lawyers, and elected officials of
the executive branch should mean what they say and do what they
mean.

317

See Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design,
124 Harv. L. Rev. 1422, 1443 n.50 (2011).
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